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The purpose of this thesis is to explore the 
application of high resolution modeling in the Army Special 
Operations Aviation mission planning process. This thesis 
looks at the unique missions Special Operations Forces are 
expected to perform, often at very high levels of public 
scrutiny, and how the use of combat simulation can assist 
commanders, planners and staffs in simplifying the frictions 
encountered in the planning process. The main objective of 
this study is to define common practical uses for combat 
simulation in deliberate and time sensitive mission 
planning. 
This investigation surveys the use of special 
operations to achieve key foreign policy objectives and the 
ability of combat simulation to provide answers to potential 
questions and to stimulate queries to subjects that 
operators may not have considered germane to the outcome of 
the mission. By applying combat simulation in the mission 
planning process, planners can streamline decision making 
capabilities by constructing correct and visible paths to 
valid conclusions. An historical case study, the raid on 
the Son Tay prisoner of war camp in North Vietnam in 1970, 
serves as a instructive example to demonstrate basic 
v 
applications of combat simulation in the mission planning 
process and investigating variables possibly cogent to the 
outcome of the mission. 
Finally, a discussion on high resolution special 
operations models used at the United States Special 
Operations Command and their architecture for future mission 
planning modeling will assist in spanning the chasm from the 
Cold War paradigm to new and unexpected tactical scenarios. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1 
A. PURPOSE ........................................................................................... 1 
B. OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................... 3 
C. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION ................................................................... 4 
D. AUDIENCE .......................................................................................... 8 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................ 8 
F. ORGANIZATION .................................................................................. 10 
IT. SIMULATION MODELING ....................................................................... 13 
A. MODELING ........................................................................................ 13 
B. SIMULATION ............................................................................................... 17 
C. WARGAMING .................................................................................... 20 
Ill. JANUS ................................................................................................ 23 
A. JANUS OVERVIEW ............................................................................. 23 
B. SIMULATION: MONTE CARLO STYLE ...................................................... 27 
1. The Stochastic Process ......................................................................... 28 
2. The Janus Database ............................................................................. 30 
C. ADDITIONAL FEATURES OF JANUS ......................................................... 32 
D. SUMMARY ......................................................................................... 33 
vii 
IV. JOINT DOCTRINE AND SOF MISSION PLANNING ......................................... 35 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 35 
B. JOINT DOCTRINE AND SOF .................................................................. 36 
C. MISSION PLANNING ........................................................................... 39 
1. Deliberate Planning .............................................................................. 40 
2. Time-Sensitive Planning ...................................................................... .41 
D. TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING CYCLE ...................................................... 44 
E. ARSOA MISSION PLANNING ................................................................... .45 
F. COAFORMULATION ........................................................................... 48 
1. Tactical Decision Making Process ......................................................... .48 
2. COA Analysis ................................................................................... 50 
G. PLANNING WITH COMBAT SIMULATION ............................................... 51 
V. COMBAT MODELING AND "OPERATION KINGPIN" .................................... 53 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 53 
B. PRESUMPTIONS ................................................................................. 55 
1. Database ........................................................................................ 55 
2. Systems Analyst/Combat Model Specialist. .................. ~ ............................ 56 
3. Intelligence ...................................................................................... 57 
4. Terrain Files ................................................................................... 57 
5. Mission Types .................................................................................. 58 
viii 
C. PLANNING WITH COMBAT SIMULATION ............................................... 58 
1. Repetitive Scenario Runs ..................................................................... 59 
2. Time Deliberation ............................................................................. 60 
D. THESONTAYRAID ........................................................................... 62 
E. APPLICATION OF COMBAT SIMULATION ....................... -....................... 70 
1. Scenario "1" Entire Assault Force ......................................................... 74 
2. Scenario "2" Split Assault Force ................................................................ 75 
3. Scenario "3" Secondary School Clash ..................................................... 77 
4. Scenario "4" Aircraft Losses ................................................................ 78 
5. Scenario "5" Aircraft vs. RPG Teams in Towers .......................................... 80 
6. Scenario "6" Aircraft vs. Hidden RPG Teams ............................................. 81 
F. SUMMARY ........................................................................................ 82 
VI. FUTURE OF SOF MODELING, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 85 
A. ADDITIONAL COMBAT SIMULATION ROLES ..................................................... 86 
1. Historical Case Library ............................................................................................ 86 
2. Electronic Sand Table .............................................................................................. 87 
3. After Action Tool. ............................ , ...................................................................... 88 
4. War Gaming Tool. ................................................................................................... 88 
5. Mission Preview ...................................................................................................... 90 
6. Order of Battle Database .......................................................................................... 91 
ix 
B. CURRENT USSOCOM MODELS ............................................................................... 92 
C. MISSION PLANNING MODELS FOR THE FUTURE .............................................. 94 
1. MP ARE Mission Planning ....................................................................................... 96 
2. Mission Analysis ...................................................................................................... 96 
3. Mission Preview, Rehearsal, and Execution ............................................................ 96 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................. 97 
1. Education .................................................................................................................. 97 
2. Terrain Files ...... ; ...................................................................................................... 99 
3. Database Integrity .................................................................................................... 99 
E. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................... : ................................. 100 
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................ 103 
APPENDIX A. JANUS FEATURES ................................................................. 1 07 
APPENDIX B. CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS (SO) AND 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOP) ................................................................. 111 
APPENDIX C. TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING CYCLE AND TARGETING 
DIAGRAM ........................................................................................................................... 113 
APPENDIX D. TIME-SENSITIVE MISSION PLANNING CYCLE ........................... 115 
LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 117 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................................ 119 
X 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Force Characteristics- SOF and General Purpose Forces ....................................... 5 
Figure 2. Modeling Process ............................................................................ 16 
Figure 3. Current and Future Goals of Army Aviation Simulation ................................ 20 
Figure 4. Janus Database Hierarchical Diagram .............................................................. 31 
Figure 5. Movement Nodes ............................................................................. 32 
Figure 6. Route of the Son Tay Raid Force ........................................................... 71 
Figure 7. Son Tay Compound .......................................................................... 72 
Figure 8. Secondary School Overhead View ........................ : ................................. 73 




A French proverb declares: Gratitude is the heart's memory. 
I would be extremely ungrateful if I did not thank those who have 
given so much to make this project tolerable if not somewhat 
enjoyable. I want to thank Bard Mansager for believing in high 
resolution modeling. His passion was contagious. I appreciate 
Professor Maurice Weir's refining editorial touch to this thesis. 
Thanks to Jennifer Duncan and Gordon McCormick for allowing me to 
travel and conduct research. To John Cox, thanks for your insight 
and desire to get modeling into the hands of warriors. Thanks to 
Kenny McMullin, a Son Tay raider and American hero for his 
willingness to try. Heartfelt thanks to Lt.Col. Larry Chesley, a 
POW in North Vietnam for almost seven years and a Son Tay resident, 
for his vivid recollection of what must have been hell on earth. 
Thanks to Bob Wilson for his expert advice on combat simulation. 
Thanks to MAJ John Buss for his superb logistical support. To my 
wife April and children Patrick, Ira, Harrison and Kalee, thanks for 
your understanding and patience while I camped behind the computer. 
I will never be able to repay you for your devotion to me. Finally, 
to all Night Stalkers who put it on the line every time you strap 
in. May you continue to set the night-flying standard and return 




One of the greatest quests of the prolific Prussian 
military strategist Carl von Clausewitz was to answer the 
question: "How can we analyze war?" 1 This pursuit continues 
today as special operations (SO) commanders, staffs, and 
planners strive to understand the critical variables which can 
curtail the success of the best planned special operations 
missions. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the heuristic 
application of high resolution modeling in the Army Special 
Operations Aviation (ARSOA) mission planning process. One of 
the main objectives of this study is to define common practical 
uses for combat simulation in deliberate and time sensitive 
mission planning. 
Because ARSOA normally works in support of Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) to include Special Forces, Rangers, and 
Navy SEALS, mission planning must be precise, complete and in 
perfect harmony with the supported component. 
SOF is expected to perform, with a high degree of success, 
unique and politically sensitive missions, often at very high 
levels of public scrutiny. The use of combat simulation can 
1 See Peter Paret, "Clausewitz", Makers of Modern Strategy from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press) 
pp. 186-213. 
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assist commanders, planners and staffs in simplifying the 
frictions of war2 often encountered in the planning process. 
In Chapter I the investigation surveys the use of SO to 
achieve key foreign policy objectives and the ability of combat 
simulation to provide answers to potential quest~ons and to 
stimulate queries to subjects that operators may not have 
considered germane to the outcome of the mission. By applying 
combat simulation in the mission planning process, planners can 
streamline decision making capabilities by constructing correct 
and visible paths to valid conclusions. 
Chapter II surveys basic concepts of modeling and 
simulation and their use for better comprehension of complex 
systems. It would be extremely impractical if not criminal for 
researchers to test the destructive capabilities of rocket 
propelled grenades (RPG) on helicopters in different flight 
profiles. The mathematical modeling process simplifies such 
complex "real world" phenomenon. This process consists of the 
following four steps: 
1. Make specific observations about the behavior 
being studied and make simplifications. 
2. Conjecture relationships among the factors. 
2 Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, describes Clausewitz's "friction" as 
"uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen, 
and to their effect on decisions, morale, and ... is everywhere in contact 
with chance ... it is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult." 
pp. 202-203. 
xvi 
3. Apply mathematical analysis to the consequent 
"model". 
4. Explain mathematical conclusions in terms of 
the real-world puzzle. 3 
High resolution combat models cache the parameters of the 
real-world data to simulate the environment through the use of 
mathematical algorithms and functions. From this process we 
can perform analysis and "see" the high resolution modeling 
results. Warfighters can tap into this "electronic sand table" 
to review and identify critical nodes in a mission. 
Chapter III discusses the high resolution model, Janus, 
used for the analytical portion of this thesis. Janus is an 
interactive war gaming simulation primarily designed for ground 
maneuver units. It does model aircraft weather, day and night 
visibility, engineer support and a chemical environment. This 
model was used because of its availability at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) . It is not within the scope of this 
thesis to argue the viability of Janus as a SOF model. It does 
have weaknesses but also has illustrative qualities. 
Chapter IV surveys joint doctrine mission planning 
guidance for SOF forces and their role within the broader 
conventional scope of war. 
3Frank R. Giordano & Maurice D. Weir, A First Course in Mathematical 
Modeling (Monterey, CA:Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1985) pp. 30-31. 
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Chapter V applies the concepts of modeling and planning in 
a demonstrative case study, the raid on the Son Tay prisoner of 
war camp in North Vietnam in 1970. This serves as an 
instructive example to illustrate basic applications of combat 
simulation in the mission planning process and to investigate 
variables possibly cogent to the outcome of the mission. 
Finally, Chapter VI provides a discussion on high 
resolution SO models used at the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the command's proposed 
architecture for future mission planning-modeling, Mission 
Planning, Analysis, Rehearsal, Execution (MPARE) System, which 
will assist in spanning the chasm from the Cold War paradigm to 
new and unexpected tactical scenarios. MPARE will allow SOF 
war-fighters to "pull" critical information from a broad 
spectrum of sources by implementing sophisticated browsing 
tools. Combat modeling will be incorporated into the 
architecture. Combat modeling's additional SOF applications 
include: 
• Historical case library 
• Electronic sand table 
• After action tool 
• Wargaming tool 
• Mission preview platform 
• Enemy and friendly order of battle database 
xviii 
The employment of combat modeling in the actual detailed 
planning will require a paradigm shift for SOF commanders, 
staffs and planners. We are presently in a transition period 
in which new technological aids may not be readily accepted. 
Old habits are hard to break. The Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Research, Development and Acquisition, a former Army 
aviator stated: 
... I believe the main message is that simulation is 
like software and computing power. When software and 
computing power became used routinely by everyone, it 
revolutionized the world, moving it from an 
industrially-based world to an information-based 
world. I think simulation is the aggregation of this 
technology. It offers great insight where we might 
be in the future ... Simulation will revolutionize our 
thinking and certainly have a major impact on our 
military operations. 4 
While ARSOA and SOF planning is already extremely detailed 
and sophisticated, combat simulation may offer the edge which 
will overcome the assumptions and uncertainties of SO. 
4 Gilbert F. Decker, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, 
Development and Acquisition, made these comments at the Army Aviation 
Association of America Simulation Symposium, September 6, 1996. 
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:I. :INTRODUCTION 
"Yes, we have slain the dragon. But now we live 
in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of 
poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon 
was easier to keep track of.u 
James Woolsey 
For.mer Director of the CIA after the end Of 
the Cold War 
A. PURPOSE 
The intent of this research is to discuss the utility 
of HIGH RESOLUTION COMBAT MODELING1 as an analytical tool in 
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION {ARSOA) mission planning. 
Subordinate commanders of SPECIAL OPERATIONS (SO) are given 
a great amount of latitude to plan missions in support of 
the Special Operations Command (SOC) commander's mission 
guidance and intent. 
Joint special operations doctrine requires great 
flexibility in anticipation of a rapidly changing 
environment during mission planning. Comprehensive and 
detailed mission planning, based on specific and accurate 
tactical intelligence, is vital to successful mission 
execution and also to the very survival of the operational 
element. 2 
1 Definitions of bold and capitalized terms found in glossary. 
2 Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special 
Operations, Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992. 
There are two types of mission planning: deliberate 
and time-sensitive. Deliberate planning involves relying on 
assumptions regarding the environment that will exist when 
the plan is executed. The situation does not yet exist. The 
commander, special operations command (COMSOC) _is 
responsible for all levels of deliberate planning in the 
form of theater-level operational plans (OPLANS) and 
conceptual operational plans (CONPLANS) . 
Time-sensitive planning concerns itself with the 
deployment and resources of forces in response to an actual 
situation. The COMSOC also actively deals with all elements 
of time-sensitive planning at the theater level. Successful 
mission planning, whether it be deliberate or time 
sensitive, is dependent on the quality and thoroughness of 
mission planning preparedness. Both types of planning 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
The application of high resolution combat simulation 
modeling in the commander's planning process, whether 
deliberate or time-sensitive, which if thoughtfully used, 
can allow the COMSOC or his MISSION PLANNING AGENT (MPA), 
greater vision of mission objectives and better 
understanding of critical nodes of the operation. 
2 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The primary focus of this thesis is to explore the 
utility of high resolution combat simulation modeling in 
ARSOA mission planning. This thesis addresses issues 
that will enhance the ARSOA commander and his staff's 
understanding of modeling as a tool and resource for mission 
analysis, course of action (COA) selection, mission 
sensitivity analysis, and after action review (AAR) 
enhancement. 
The main objective of this research is to explore the 
potential validation of high resolution combat simulation 
~odeling in ARSOA mission planning. 3 While this paper will 
emphasize high resolution modeling and its employment within 
the ARSOA mission planning cycle, its applicability goes 
beyond aviation specific special operations forces (SOF) 
mission planning and analysis. (Special Forces teams are 
currently exposed to modeling at the Joint Readiness 
~ Training Center [JRTC] for training and course of action 
selection) . Because ARSOA planners must work closely with 
supported SOF assets, planning and analysis must be unified 
and mutually supportive. 
3 This thesis has been influenced by the research of Lt. Jeff Hakala, 
USN, Combat Simulation Modeling in Naval Special Warfare Mission 
Planning, 1995. My research is in great part an extension of his work 
and its applicability to ARSOA mission planning. 
3 
The integration of high resolution combat simulation 
modeling as an analytical tool in the hands of commanders 
and MPAs requires tactical vision, confident implementation, 
and hands-on utilization and experience in training 
scenarios in preparation for real-world missions and 
contingencies. While tactical modeling and simulation in 
the hands of warfighters as an analytical mission planning 
tool will be readily available in the future, a clear 
understanding of its potential is critical for its impending 
successful implementation in the future. This paper is 
intended to acquaint and inform readers with the potential 
tactical uses of combat simulation modeling which has 
here to fore been relegated primarily to the role of a 
training instrument. 
C. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION 
Conventional military downsizing, largely due to the 
demise of the former Soviet Union, may well increase the 
employment of SOF assets. The increasingly anarchic 
international system, as compared to the bi-polar Cold War 
era, may demand the utilization of well-trained SOF 
"packages" when large conventional battalions or battle 
groups may be viewed as politically incorrect or overkill. 
Regional hot spots such as Somalia, Haiti, Burundi, Liberia 
4 
and Bosnia have all recently required the unique 
capabilities offered by SOP. 
U.S. SOP differ from general forces not only in 
employment, but also differ in equipment, training and size 
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Ability 
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~~------------------------------~----
Figure 1: Force Characteristics - SOF and General Purpose Forces' 
Shrinking budgets, manpower constraints, and new and 
unexpected threats will increase the demands placed on 
SOP. H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASDSOLIC) 
said, " ... the number one priority ... is to insure that the 
extremely valuable resource, the SOP community, is properly 
used in the pursuit of our national foreign policy and 
security-policy objectives in the new global environment." 5 
As the post-Cold War era challenges almost every aspect 
4 Bruce Pirnie, Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids, 
(Santa Monica, CA:RAND, 1994) p. xi. 
5 H. Allen Holmes interview, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, in Special Warfare, 1994, Vol. 
7, No. 4, p. 46. 
5 
of our lingering Cold War military, a new vision must be 
incorporated into every facet of modern military affairs. In 
an introduction to a joint services publication on modeling 
and simulation, General John M. Shalikashvili remarked: 
As we downsize our forces and face new, evolving 
threats to our nation's security, the well-worn 
phase "do more with less" will become a way of 
life for us. Resourcefulness and imagination, 
key ingredients of successful military operations, 
will play greater roles in how we go about our 
business. 6 
U.S. Army Special Forces, Rangers and Navy 
SEALs rely on ARSOA assets who are highly trained. ARSOA 
specializes in tactics of infiltration and exfiltration, 
light attack, assault, and resupply of SOF by clandestine 
and covert penetration of hostile or denied airspace. They 
perform this with precision over extended ranges, and on 
properly equipped aircraft, during adverse flying conditions 
(limited ceiling and visibility) . 7 
ARSOA are often very unique because their wide-ranging 
capabilities allow the National Command Authority (NCA) 
great latitude and flexibility in employment options along 
6 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made these remarks in Joint 
Modeling and Simulation Evolutionary Overview, February 1994. 
7 CW4 Chuck Goering, "Introduction to Special Operations Aviation", an 
informal unit introduction document produced by 2nd Battalion, Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) Airborne. 
6 
the ever-increasing world-wide special operations continuum. 
Such missions have received the attention of a large 
international audience. 
In today's world of instantaneous global news coverage, 
the visibility of SOF assets may be anything less than 
covert. The repercussions of alleged failure may border on 
a near "zero-defect" status. The Battle of Mogadishu serves 
as an excellent example of SOF leadership not only 
contending with a hostile force but a scrutinizing media. 
The ramifications of apparent failures in Mogadishu were 
instantly transmitted to population centers around the 
world. Such mission transparency puts enormous pressure on 
SOF commanders and on the NCA to negotiate successfully 
this country's foreign policy. 
The demands on ARSOA commanders and staffs to perform 
in a very unforgiving public environment requires the 
skillful utilization of all available resources to 
successfully plan, rehearse and execute ARSOA missions. 
Modeling and simulation can be valuable tools in the tool 
kit of operational planners and staffs. It is no longer a 
luxury to utilize technology in the execution of SOF mission 
planning. An understanding of its potential usefulness can 
reap great rewards in the execution of ARSOA missions. 
7 
D. AUDIENCE 
This paper is written primarily for those familiar with 
ARSOA mission planning and SO doctrinal terms and concepts 
as found in Joint Pubs 3-05, 3-05.3 and 3-05.5. 8 Also 
included are modeling and simulation definitions necessary 
for an integrated understanding of simulation modeling as an 
analytical tool in ARSOA mission planning. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The design of this research is based on a premise that 
few readers have been exposed to the benefits of high 
resolution combat simulation modeling when applied to 
tactical aviation planning, whether deliberate or time--
sensitive. To facilitate the reader's introduction to 
the research design, an overview of the mathematical 
modeling process in simulation is included. Using this 
discussion as a basis for understanding, the investigation 
will provide a general overview of the concepts, attributes 
and limitations of combat modeling as it applies to SOF and, 
more specifically, ARSOA mission planning. The central 
point of this paper is to consolidate the abstract concepts 
of simulation modeling and to bridge the chasm of 
8 Joint Pub 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 1992, Joint Pub 
3-05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, 1993, and Joint 
Pub 3-05.5 Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning 
Procedures, 1993. 
8 
understanding between modeling and mission planning. The 
Janus 6.0 High Resolution Combat Model demonstrates the 
applicability of combat modeling in enhancing the ARSOA 
planning process. 
Janus is an interactive war gaming simulation. It was 
the tool used for illustrative purposes and was selected for 
this study because of its accessibility at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. Moreover, this simulation model has 
been used in one version or another in the Army since 1973 
and contains most of the attributes found in other military 
simulations including the Joint Conflict Model(JCM) and 
Joint Tactical Simulation Model(JTS). These models evolved 
from Janus and are in use at the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) . These specific simulations 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI. Weaknesses of 
Janus will also be discussed in regard to ARSOA mission 
planning. As primarily a ground maneuver based model 
designed for brigade and battalion level operations, Janus 
also models weather, day and night visibility, engineer 
support, indirect artillery fire, minefield employment and 
breaching, rotary and fixed wing aircraft, resupply, and 
chemical environment. 
There are drawbacks and limitations to utilizing Janus 
for ARSOA mission planning. Understanding these limitations 
is important and do not degrade the sound reasons for this 
9 
research. Such a model can be used to construct correct 
paths from premises to conclusions. 9 It also allows 
questions to surface which may otherwise have gone unasked. 
This paper underscores the generic application of modeling 
in the ARSOA planning process and the benefits _of model use. 
Janus is used as a baseline for discussion and 
conceptualization of definitive points regarding high 
resolution modeling in ARSOA mission planning. Such 
investigative discussion facilitates the modification of 
existing, or the development of new models specifically 
designed for SOF aviation missions. Future combat modeling 
systems will also be discussed in chapter VI. Janus is not 
a panacea for the ARSOA mission planner. Yet, by utilizing 
it in this research to explore its benefits and uncover its 
drawbacks when applied in the ARSOA mission planning 
process, it can be used as a stepping stone to future ARSOA 
combat models. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This paper is divided into six chapters including the 
introduction. Following the introduction, Chapter II 
addresses the background of modeling and simulation within 
9 See James s_ Hodges, ~six (or so) Things You Can Do with a Bad Model, 
Operations Research, Vol. 39, No. 3, PP- 355-365, May-June 1991 
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SOF and the military. Chapter III provides an overview 
of Janus and its various functions. Chapter IV discusses SOF 
doctrinal tenets and the implications of combat modeling in 
the ARSOA mission planning process. Chapter V looks at the 
application of high rersolution modeling and SQF planning on 
an historical case study: the attempted rescue of prisoners 
of war (POWs) in North Vietnam in 1970 during the Son Tay 
Raid or "Operation Kingpin". The future of SOF combat 
modeling, along with recommendations and conclusions, is 
explored in the final chapter. 
11 
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II. SIMULATION MODELING 
"If I always appeared prepared, it is because 
before entering an undertaking, I have medi-
tated for long and have foreseen what may 
occur. It is not genius which reveals to me 
suddenly and secretly what I should do in 
circumstances unexpected by others, it is 
thought and preparation." 
Napoleon Bonaparte 
Simulation modeling can be a powerful tool to better 
understand complex systems. It allows users to create 
models of real-world processes which are too complex to be 
analyzed by spreadsheets, flowcharts or diagrams. It is a 
cost effective and efficient communications tool to show how 
an operation or process works while stimulating creative 
thinking about how the operation can be improved. 
A basic understanding of mathematical modeling is 
important for understanding the applicability of combat 
simulation modeling. 
A. MODELING 
A model can be something as elementary as a simplified 
representation of the entity it imitates or simulates. 10 
A model can also be described as a "logical description of 
10 Military Modeling, ed., Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., The Military Operations 
Research Society, 1989, p. 1. 
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how a system, process or component behaves." 11 Instead of 
interacting with the real system, a model can be constructed 
to portray certain aspects of a real-world situation. A 
representative example is the board game Monopoly. This 
game is a model of a real system: the hotels and facilities 
of Atlantic City. A player must negotiate the modeled world 
of the Atlantic City real estate domain. The player assumes 
the risks and ventures of a business person using fictitious 
money, property, utilities possibly incurring jail time. 
The model allows the player to learn, experiment and 
experience with out really risking "real" money, 
incarceration or bankruptcy. This type of model is only as 
good as the ability of the player to learn from the 
experience. 
If an MPA wanted to better understand a specific 
phenomenon (for example, the relationship between an RPG 
effectiveness on a UH-60 helicopter at different distances 
and altitudes in different types of terrain qnd visibility), 
a model can be used to explore the possibilities. It would 
be extremely impractical to submit multimillion-dollar 
aircraft to the firepower of RPG projectiles to better 
understand the destructive outcomes. A model can be 
11 Definition located on the Internet at 
http://www.imaginethatinc.com/aboutsim.htm 
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developed to test certain hypotheses and make predictions 
based on the user's analysis. 
Models, in particular COMBAT MODELS, can give the user 
a feel for the terrain and the ability to "visualize" the 
conduct of operations on that terrain. This is_a valuable 
asset for the mission planner to utilize an "electronic 
sand table" to develop, review, and identify critical nodes 
in operations. 12 The prohibitive costs of utilizing real 
aircraft and crews to experiment with the effects of RPGs 
versus UH-60 helicopters is self explanatory as to why 
models are needed. 
Frank R. Giordano and Maurice D. Weir describe models 
as mathematical constructs designed to analyze a particular 
real world system or phenomenon (see Figure 2). Weir and 
Giordano define a system, that behavior which a model 
attempts to capture or represent, as "an assemblage of 
objects joined in some regular interaction or 
interdependence. " 13 Systems, by the nature of this 
definition, are important to the MPA who incorporates 
modeling into the mission planning equation. 
12 This concept is attributed to Professor Bard Mansager, an expert in 
mathematical modeling at the Naval Postgraduate School and a advocate of 
modeling at the warfighter level. 
13 Frank R. Giordano and Maurice D. Weir, A First Course in 
Mathematical Modeling, (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Pub. Co_, 1985) p.3Q_ 
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Observation 




Conclusions Interpretation Conclusions 
Figure 2: Modeling Process 
(Data from Giordano and Weir, p. 30) 
On the left side of Figure 2, "Real-World Data" 
is an observation made by the MPA, mission planner, staff or 
commander. The planner gathers information to begin 
formulation of the model. This process is based primarily on 
the knowledge of the issues pertaining to the "mission" or 
contingency operation. Assumptions play a large role in the 
cognitive process. 
A combat model should be assessed by how well it allows 
the planner to understand the variables of the mission and 
through utilizing the model to make predictions or offer 
explanations. This process will be demonstrated in Chapter 
V which as the use of modeling as an "electronic sand table" 
is illustrated during the mission planning process. 
The precision or exactness of the model's 
representation of the "real-world" is critical to assessing 
16 
its validity or effectiveness. Versatility is also an 
essential property of a model. The MPA must be able to 
continually update data and control conditions to accurately 
portray the modeled phenomenon. These attributes allow 
models to be .tools not only for predictive power but for 
"description and understanding. " 14 
B. SIMULATION 
A simulation does more than depicting a phenomenon; it 
imitates it. The Simulation Network (SIMNET) at Fort 
Rucker, Alabama is a battle simulation which looks at the 
combination of men, tanks, fixed and rotary aircraft, 
together with their interrelationships and composite effects 
on the battlefield. 
Simulation can also involve designing a model of a 
system, process, or component and carrying out experiments 
on it. Simulation allows the "operator" to "what if" the 
experiments to determine how the real system performs and to 
predict the effect of changes to the system. For example, 
simulation can help aviators answer the following questions: 
• What are the proper procedures to handle specific 
life threatening in-flight emergencies? 
• When flying under instrument flight rules (IFR) and 
you encounter a dual generator failure, what are the 
ramifications? 
14 Wayne P. Hughes, Military Modeling, p. vii. 
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• If a specific catastrophic maneuver is expected in 
the crash of an aircraft, can that maneuver be 
duplicated in a simulator to test hypotheses? 
This type of simulation is an abstract of or based on a real 
asset. An example would be an aircraft simulator versus the 
real item. 
Army Aviation has long been in the forefront of 
simulation as an extremely beneficial asset in training and 
maintaining pilot proficiency. While such simulation is an 
abstraction, it can be a powerful abstraction if it is 
wisely employed. Some situations must be rehearsed in a 
simulatori they are just too dangerous to try out in an 
aircraft during actual flight. When aviators use simulation 
(cockpit simulators) to rehearse potentially catastrophic 
emergency situations (i.e. dual engine failure at max gross 
weight or fire), powerful and enduring lessons can be 
learned. Such reliance on simulation is critical to pilot 
proficiency. The hours spent in a simulation device can 
save time, money and lives. 
There are basically three types of combat simulations: 
LIVE SIMULATION, VIRTUAL SIMULATION, and CONSTRUCTIVE 
SIMULATION. MG Ronald E. Adams, Branch Chief and 
Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center called 
for a need to balance the use of all three. Presently, live 
simulation accounts for approximately 80 percent of 
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conventional aviation flight hours. Virtual simulation 
amounts to approximately 15 percent, while the cost of 
constructive simulation accounts for five percent. 15 
Live simulations are costly, not only in flight hour 
dollars, but in maintenance time and repair costs as well. 
While it is critical and essential to maintain a high degree 
of proficiency, MG Adams claims virtual and constructive 
simulation can pay great dividends. 16 The Army Aviation 
Branch Chief stated that the goals for simulation training 
and implementation of greater virtual and constructive 
simulation be increased (see Figure 3). 
15 MG Adams made these remarks during the keynote address at the first 
Army Aviation Association of America(AAAA) Simulation Symposium on 
August 5, 1996 in Alexandria, Virginia. In a speech entitled "The Future 
Of Army Simulation is Now", MG Adams called for advance simulation 
studies and improvement at the user level. 
16 A recent preliminary study (May 1996) conducted at the Army Research 
Institute exposed one group of flight students to 7.5 hours of basic 
maneuver simulation training prior to initial flights in the actual 
aircraft. Another group went directly to the flight line without the 
simulation hours. Students with the simulation training soloed sooner 
(average 6.0 hours sooner) and were "put up" for check rides on an 











Figure 3: Current and Future Goals of Ar.my Aviation Simulation 
C. WAR GAMING 
The term "war gaming// has multiple connotations. Joint 
Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, defines a war game as "a simulation by 
whatever means, of a military operation involving two or 
more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures 
designed to depict an actual or assumed real life 
situation. " 17 War gaming can also infer the non-destructive 
simulation of armed combat. It does not mean it is the 
actual play, but the study of how to successfully wage 
war with the appropriate resources . 18 "War gaming involves 
a replication of warfare without combat, which allows 
17 Joint Publication (Pub) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 1 December 1989, p. 393. 
18 From the Internet: http://www.wpc.af.mil/cax.html 
20 
opponents to repeatedly respond to each others varied 
thrusts. By studying the results, they can improve their 
combat skills, and using this knowledge they become more 
likely to win." 19 
War gaming can also be viewed as a distinctive break 
from an actual exercise (live simulation) . War games are 
intended to exercise the human mind and its application of 
essential forces without applying the actual resources 
required. As an example, an entire joint special 
operations task force (JSOTF) and its functions could be a 
desired level of a war game. The support organizations, 
however, such as ARSOA aircraft and crews, Navy SEAL 
teams, or special electronic warfare assets would be 
simulated. 
Classical war games are not just the demanding and 
detailed analysis of a particular problem or contingency, 
but also "an exercise in human interaction, and the 
interplay of human decisions and the outcomes of those 




20 Peter P. Perla and LCDR Raymond T. Barrett, USN War Gaming and its 
Uses, Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Professional Paper 429 
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1984) p. 2; Ralph E. 
McDonald, Cohesion, The Key to Special Operations Teamwork, (Maxwell 
Air Force base: Air University Press, 1994) pp. 44-53. 
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Today, the simulation and war gaming processes are 
becoming almost indistinguishable. Yet, while ARSOA is 
extremely active in exercising the training benefits of 
simulation, there is a lack of participation in SOF war 
gaming, especially at the tactical level. Some ARSOA crew 
members may contend that free-play live simulations 
accomplish the same objectives as war games. While this 
rationale may be true in some cases, exercises are extremely 
costly in personnel and equipment requirements. While war 
gaming would allow shrinking flight hours and escalating 
maintenance requirements to be utilized more efficiently, 
aviation crews would require an attitudinal paradigm shift. 
Aviators want to fly. 
While free-play live simulation exercises have been 
the prime source of training in the past, the ability to 
stop or control time in order to review and explore issues, 
is difficult to do once the exercise begins. 
ARSOA "must further explore and exploit war gaming 
educational opportunities, especially in the tactical 
environment. "21 
21 McDonald, Cohesion, The Key to Special Operations Teamwork, p. 53. 
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:r:r:r. JANUS 
"No study is possible on the battlefield. " 
Ferdinand Foch 
"Fortune favors the prepared mind." 
Louis Pasteur 
A. JANUS OVERVIEW 
Janus is an interactive, high resolution war gaming 
simulation named for the two faced Roman god who was the 
guardian of portals and the patron of beginnings and 
endings. The current version, Janus 6.0, is a six-sided, 
closed, STOCHASTIC, ground combat simulation featuring 
precise color graphics. "Interactive" refers to the 
interplay between the military personnel, who decide what to 
do in crucial situations during simulated combat, and the 
systems that model the combat. "Six-sided" refers to the 
number of sides which may be simulated at once. "Closed" 
means that the nature of opposing sides is largely unknown 
to players in control of a side. "Stochastic" refers to the 
way the system determines the results of direct fire 
engagements, according to probability and chance. 
While Janus is primarily a simulation model designed 
for ground maneuver assets, it also models weather, day and 
night visibility, engineer support, minefield employment, 
breaching, rotary and fixed wing aircraft, resupply, 
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and a chemical environment. This thesis focuses on the 
rotary aircraft aspects of the model with some discussion 
on fixed wing aircraft. 
Janus uses digitized terrain developed by the Defense 
Mapping Agency (DMA), portraying the terrain in a form 
familiar to military users, with contour lines, roads, 
rivers, vegetation, and urban areas. Fences, buildings and 
generic areas (such as swamps or no-go areas) can also be 
displayed. Generic strings such as pipelines, power lines, 
rail lines and berms can be exhibited as well. 
Colors are slightly different than those used on 
military maps: contour lines are brown, rivers and bodies 
of water are blue, roads are brown or gray with white 
outlines, urban areas are yellow, and vegetation is green. 
Fences are red, and generic areas and strings can be 
portrayed in various colors. [An important note: terrain 
realistically affects visibility and movement.] 
Janus allows the user to portray each individual system 
(e.g., a tank, or aircraft) with an icon. A planner can then 
"analyze and modify the actions of an individual combat 
process and collect the data from the resultant outcomes."
22 
Individual icons can represent any number of same system 
objects. A squad, platoon or company can all be depicted 
22 Hakala, Combat Simulation Modeling in Naval Special Warfare Mission 
Planning, p. 14. 
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with a single icon and their actions can be altered, 
observed and or quantified. 
Like most other simulation models, Janus allows the 
user to simplify complex probabilistic behavior. Janus 
simulation can act as an architecture for understanding the 
complexities of SOF mission planning. The mere process of 
modeling can act as a stimulus to intuitive thought 
processes during the mission planning process. Chapter V 
explores conceptual applications of modeling within a 
mission planning scenario. 
Janus is not a SOF specific simulation. Modeling 
tactical ARSOA missions in a predominantly low-level, 
"zero" illumination aviation environment is less than 
ideal. Certain ARSOA specific missions, including amphibious 
support operations, are difficult to portray realistically. 
Janus was not intended to analyze such specific operations; 
its initial development was designed more for battalion and 
brigade size operations. 
Another weakness in using Janus is the limited options 
for flight envelopes. Users can only distinguish between 
Low/Slow (Nap-1) or High/Fast (Nap-2) options during route 
execution. Altitudes and velocities (flight speeds) can be 
adjusted in the database for each aircraft. However, once 
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the simulation starts, altitudes and airspeeds cannot be 
adjusted (which takes away from human judgment inputs) . 23 
The Janus simulation also uses the Universal Transverse 
Mercator (UTM) versus latitude and longitude. Most ARSOA 
flight planning uses 1:500,000 for long-range non-tactical 
flying; Joint Operation Graphic (JOGs) for planning and 
flying the enroute portion; and 1:50,000 tactical maps for 
objective location. The user must mentally, or with the use 
of a computer program, convert from UTM to latitude and 
longitude for pin point accuracy. 
While Janus 6.0 does model the human element, it lacks 
the detail and sophistication requisite for SOF, 
specifically ARSOA operations, where the interaction of 
various human decision-making processes affect the 
survivability of ARSOA specific platforms (MH-47s, MH-60s, 
and MH-6s). Janus 6.0, for example, now allows individuals 
mounted on a unit (aircraft, landing craft, trucks, etc.) to 
fire at an acquired target while still mounted on that unit. 
So, an MH-6 helicopter with SF soldiers riding on the skids, 
could fire at an adversary while still mounted. Yet, the 
pilot of the aircraft, if he encounters a threat, cannot 
perform evasive maneuvers outside of his preplanned route 
profile. SOF models need more detail to better simulate 
complex tactical situations. While few combat simulations 
23 See Database Manager's Guide, pp. 76-77. 
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effectively model individual tactical play, this feature 
would need to be enhanced to effectively support extensive 
ARSOA use. 
While specific strengths and weaknesses of the Janus 
model are not thoroughly addressed in this thesis, high 
resolution modeling in general is discussed as a valuable 
tool for mission planning. 
B. SIMULATION: MONTE CARLO STYLE 
Most simulation models are either deterministic or 
probabilistic. Deterministic models assume that every event, 
act, or decision is the inevitable consequence of happenings 
that are independent of the human will. Lanchester Combat 
Models are representative of deterministic models, where the 
results are determined by mathematical formulae which are 
not subject to probability distributions. The outcomes in 
deterministic models are constant and not subjected to 
randomness. The exact same outcomes will occur under the 
exactly same conditions. Processes with an element of 
chance, such as flipping a coin or rolling dice, are 
probabilistic and more accurately capture human involvement. 
Most military models are probabilistic, using Monte 
Carlo simulation; Janus is no exception. This type of 
simulation involves computers with the capacity to store 
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measurements associated with real-world systems from a 
simulated environment using probabilistic algorithms and 
functions. (A detailed discussion of the technical 
intricacies of the Monte Carlo simulation process is beyond 
the scope of this paper.) Finalized data so generated is 
used for analysis and explanation of the simulated behavior. 
The Monte Carlo process is especially useful in the 
analysis of a complex probabilistic conduct, such as a 
combat mission. 
1. The Stochastic Process 
Microsoft Bookshelf defines the term "stochastic" as 
"involving or containing a random variable or variables; 
involving chance or probability." Monte Carlo simulation 
is often considered synonymous with stochastic simulation, 
signified by an element of randomness to the particular 
outcome of a particular event. 24 The generation of this 
randomness is key to successful combat modeling. 
It is impossible to account for every factor associated 
with a particular occurrence in the real-world. The best 
trained football teams in the country account for as many 
variables as possible when they run a given play. Each 
offensive player has a specific role to perform during the 
execution of the play. Yet, the same play run time and again 
24 Hakala, p .11 
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under the same conditions will most likely yield different 
results. Why? Differences in offensive timing, subtle 
changes in temperature, unaccounted for defensive reaction, 
minute changes in player positioning, etc. all account for 
differences in the outcome. While most plays are designed, 
if executed per plan, to score touchdowns, so many variables 
are involved that account for the one in ten (or for some 
teams one in a thousand) plays which actually result in a 
score. 
A simulation reproduces these random effects through 
the use random numbers generation. In the Janus simulation, 
for example, if all the factors are satisfied for a tank to 
fire at an enemy target, the final outcome is determined by 
a random number generation over a specific distribution of 
values. If the simulation is designed for a 80 percent kill 
rate (8 out of 10 probability) under the given 
circumstances, (again variables like distance, line-of-
sight [LOS], terrain, etc. play a part in the number 
generation) a random number draw between 0 and 10 takes 
place which is compared to the number 8. If the randomly 
drawn number is less than or equal to 8, it designates a 
kill; A number greater than 8 is a miss. Because there is 
no way to predict the hits and misses each time, randomness 
occurs but in accordance with the designated 80 percent kill 
rate. 
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Like the example of a football team, which does not 
yield the same results every time a given play is run, a 
simulation of a battle does not yield the exact same results 
every time. The percentages of victories and defeats may 
remain the same, but variables such as target selection, 
rounds-fired to kill-ratio, and asset losses, etc. can vary 
in the simulated combat environment, as would be the case on 
the battlefield itself. 
2. The Janus Database 
For the user to best utilize the numerous assets of 
Janus for mission planning, it is important to understand 
the fundamental principles of the database. The Janus 
Database is a complex reservoir of detailed systems which 
form the heart of the simulation. Individual fighting 
systems have distinct properties such as, dimensions, 
weight, carrying capacity, speed, weapons, as well as 
weapons' capabilities like range, type of ordnance and 
ammunition basic load. 25 As with any simulation, a precise 
and comprehensive database is crucial to the operation of 
Janus. 
Janus utilizes a hierarchical database with several 
layers of sections and sub-sections. A graphic depiction 
25 Department of the Army, Software User's Manual, Version 6.3, UNIX 
Model, Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) 
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of the database shows the depth and hierarchical 
relationships between its various portions (see Figure 4) . 
The scope and depth of information contained in the Janus 
database is complex because it models in detail so many 
different aspects of the battlefield. 
The database includes information on systems 
(soldiers, aircraft, tanks, ships, etc.), sensors (vision, 
radar, etc.) and weapons. Other information in the 
database include jammer characteristics, rotor acquisition 
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Figure 4: Janus Database Hierarchical Diagram 
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Characteristics 
C. ADDITIONAL FEATURES OF JANUS 
Janus has numerous features allowing the user to 
simplify intricate real-world scenarios. The following are 
a few of the basic aviation characteristics of the 
simulation model. 26 (For more attributes, See APPENDIX A: 
Janus Features.) 
AVIATION SPECIFIC FEATURES 
Planning Movement Routes - During initial planning, the 
planner can establish movement routes for units to follow 
during the execution phase of the simulation. These routes 
control the time and direction of unit movement. The user 
may set the movement so that the units move as soon as the 
simulation starts, or begin movement at a prearranged time, 
or begin moving in some assigned order. Movements are for 
ground and air movements (see Figure 5). A GO node appears 
as a triangle sitting on its base with one vortex pointing 
... 
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26 Taken from data in The Software Users Manual, pp. 4-7. The list is not 
an inclusive list of Janus features but will give the reader a basic 
survey of aviation related capabilities. 
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up. A GO node usually signifies a change of direction. A 
STOP node, which is portrayed by an inverted triangle with 
its base up and tip down, halts a unit. The third movement 
node is a TIME node which appears as a STOP node with a 
number under it. A unit at a time node must wait for 
movement until the displayed time matches the time on the 
simulation clock. 
Flight Mode - Each aircraft has two possible combinations 
of altitude and speed: low/slow; high/fast. Both altitude 
and speed depend on individual aircraft capability as 
described in the database. 
Aircraft Pop up - Helicopters may fly to a prearranged 
defilade position, hover, "pop up" to engage targets, drop 
down to a hover, then pop up for another look. Helicopters 
can use terrain, buildings etc., to hide from enemy units. 
The helicopters can stay in the "pop up" mode only at STOP 
nodes and must move after firing. 
Alar.ms - A radar alarm occurs when an air defense radar 
detects an aircraft. Three short beeps will sound, and a 
white line connecting the (unit) with a white symbol 
representing the detecting radar appears. The white 
symbol representing the detecting radar gives only an 
indication of direction and that the aircraft has been 
identified by radar. This symbol will recur as the 
aircraft continues to move, but is not the actual 
location of the radar battery. The radar site may launch 
an air defense missile at the aircraft after locking on. 
When that occurs, the aircraft will receive another warning 
just like the detection warning except that the connecting 
line is orange. 
Low Fuel Warning - The user gets a low fuel warning 
when one of the systems reaches approximately one-eighth of 
its fuel capacity. A second and final warning occurs when 
the unit reaches one-sixteenth of its capacity. 
D. SUMMARY 
Combat Simulation can be a tool for mission planners. 
It is not a remedy for every problem a mission planner may 
face. It is not a crystal ball where the outcome of future 
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operations can be clearly seen. Nevertheless, it can 
provide a learning experience where, like an attentive and 
intuitive player at the Monopoly table, the user can explore 
viable options to assist planners in solving complex 
problems. Users must take "lessons learned" from the 
modeling process, scrutinize them, analyze their impact on 
mission objectives, and ascertain the impact of multiple 
forces affecting the tactical state. 
With a heuristic application of combat modeling in 
mission planning, simulation modeling can expand the 
horizons of COA formulation. Simulation can be the basis for 
planning and act as a decision aid to stretch the ability of 
the commander to plan and employ forces. 
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IV. JOINT DOCTRINE AND SOF MISSION PLANNING 
"War, like most things, is a science to be 
acquired and perfected by diligence, by 
perseverance, by time and by practice. " 
Alexander Hamilton 
"All the numerous applications of physics, 
chemistry, engineering, etc. which make up 
the modern arsenal are in fact at the mercy 
of humans, the soldiers who use or direct them. " 
S.T. Das 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To effectively utilize combat simulation, it is 
important to understand the principles of SOF mission 
planning as outlined in joint doctrinal publications. 
Many factors may affect decisions made during the planning 
process such as time constraints, mission urgency, the 
availability of assets, and confidence in implementing 
simulation. 
Using the previous chapters on modeling and simulation 
as a basis of understanding, this section concentrates 
on joint planning doctrine and the integration of ARSOA 
mission planning. While the implementation of simulation 
within the mission planning process is ultimately left to 
the discretion of the mission planner, this chapter provides 
the reader a basic understanding of when simulation can be 
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integrated into mission planning and it demonstrates the 
possible benefits accompanying the use of a simulation. 
B. JOINT DOCTRINE AND SOF 
Effective employment of SOP in pursuit of-national 
security policy requires a clear understanding of JOINT 
DOCTRINE. The actions and directions SO utilize to implement 
Joint Doctrine are incorporated in JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES 
and PROCEDURES (JTTP) . 27 
A mission conducted under certain environmental 
constraints may require the employment of SO expertise and 
techniques. Should one of the characteristics change, the 
assignment may no longer fit the classification of SO. For 
example, the Grenada operation was designed to rescue a 
large number of American citizens and to publicly 
demonstrate U.S. resolve. As such, this required a large, 
visible conventional operation on a relatively large scale, 
with SO in support and targeted at specific objectives. On 
the other hand, had the goals been to recover a small number 
of detained personnel with limited U.S. presence, SO may 
have been selected as the preferred option. SO actions are 
not bound by any specific environment. They are described by 
27 Joint Pub 3-05, p. I-2. 
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the transitory characteristics and constraints placed upon a 
given mission. 28 
The employment of conventional forces normally 
involves movement of large occupational units demanding 
extensive support frameworks. SOF, however, are primarily a 
function of individual and small unit proficiency in a 
multitude of specialized, often unconventional combat 
skills exercised with improvisation, speed, innovation and 
self-reliance for short periods of time. (See APPENDIX B: 
Characteristics of Special Operations and Special Operations 
Forces.) 
Special operators, utilizing tenets of joint doctrine, 
are an extremely viable alternative to the use of 
conventional forces. The small size, unusual qualities and 
self sufficient "packaged" capabilities of SOF offer the 
United States appropriate military responses that do not 
entail the degree of political liability, or possible risk 
of escalation, normally associated with the use of larger 
and more conspicuous conventional forces. 
SOF was not meant to stand alone within the scope of 
conventional military operations. SOF is most often placed 
in a supportive role to conventional military leaders as was 
the case in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti. Thus SOF is not a 
28 Ibid., p. I-3. 
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substitute for conventional forces, but rather an asset to 
be correctly utilized and implemented in combination with 
conventional forces. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. stated: 
.first, break down the wall that has more or less 
come between special operations forces and_the other 
parts of our military . . . second, educate the rest 
of the military; spread a recognition and an 
understanding of what you do, why you do it, and how 
important it is that you do it. Last, integrate your 
efforts into the full spectrum of our military 
capability. 29 
SO are usually joint, but may be conducted as a 
single-service operation. While a mission may be designated 
as a single-service operation, the support and coordination 
required most often involves other services' assistance, 
such as command-and-control structur~s and logistical 
assets. 
The unifying effects of joint doctrine, coupled with 
the implementation of JTTP, allow for unsurpassed 
capabilities within the SOF community. Such unifying 
principles are essential for mission planners to 
plan joint operations successfully. 
29 Statement by Admiral Crowe at the activation ceremony of the United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 1 June 1987. From Joint 
Pub 3-05.3, p. I-1. 
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C. MISSION PLANNING 
There are two basic types of mission planning which 
planners are, by doctrine, prepared to execute: deliberate 
planning and time-sensitive planning. These types will be 
discussed later on in this section. According-to Joint Pub 
3-05, regardless of the mission or operational environment, 
three principles of SO are extremely important: 
1. Specific targets or mission assignments for SOF 
should always contribute substantially to the 
strategic or campaign plan being executed. Limited 
resources and the extensive planning required dictate 
that a commander selectively employ SOF for high 
priority operations. Further, the sensitivity of many 
SOF missions may force the NCA to place specific 
political, legal, time-of-day, geographic, or force 
size constraints upon employing and supporting the 
force. 
2. SOF missions are complete packages- insertion 
resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction--
(ARSOA is often critical in all these phases)--to be 
thoroughly planned before committing the force. The 
nature of the target, enemy situation, and 
environmental characteristics of the operational area 
are key planning factors. They dictate the size 
and capabilities of the assigned force, the nature of 
tactical operations, methods of insertion and 
extraction, length force exposure, logistic 
requirements, and size and composition of the command 
and support structure. Although operational planning 
must focus on the objective, limiting intelligence and 
environmental information to the target area will not 
meet SOF requirements. 
3. SO can rarely be repeated if they at first fail, 
since SO targets normally are perishable either from a 
military or political viewpoint. Therefore, thorough, 
detailed, and, whenever possible, repeated rehearsal 
is critical. These rehearsals should be conducted 
with the exact force to be committed and under the 
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same time and distance constraints in an environment 
whose terrain and weather conditions closely 
approximate the operational area. A by-product of such 
rehearsal is that the operational element absorbs 
alternative courses of action and is better able to 
adapt to changed circumstances during the mission. 
Commanders should recognize and plan for such 
preparation time. 
1. Deliberate Planning 
Deliberate planning is normally conducted during 
peacetime and refers to a hypothetical situation involving 
the deployment and employment of allocated forces and 
assets intended to be available. Such planning depends on 
analytical assumptions regarding the political and military 
situation that will exist when the plan is implemented. 
National security policy is formulated by the NCA and 
conveyed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) guidance to the combatant commanders who build 
operational plans at the theater level. Most targets are 
designated by the component commanders and approved by the 
respective combatant commander to support the operational 
plan. 
Operational plans and their MPAs are identified and 
kept current until mission execution or cancellation. 
For instance, plans for operations in Haiti were continually 
reviewed, revised and "tweaked" based upon the evolving 
political, military and social environments in the country. 
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The final execution of the mission turned from a forced 
entry to the Cable News Network (CNN) meeting troops on the 
beach and at the airport of the country . 
Deliberate targeting and mission planning can be 
applicable in a protracted crisis situation, such as the 
lengthy process leading up to operations in Somalia. 
Deliberate targeting and mission planning can apply in 
wartime as part of a theater campaign plan. This planning 
can be elucidated by Operation Overlord (which included 
lengthy mission planning and rehearsals by all assets 
involved, including Rangers) or made unilaterally against 
strategic or operational targets, such as the SO SPECIAL 
RECONNAISANCE (SR) and DIRECT ACTION (DA) missions in 
Operation Desert Storm, where SOF was tasked to locate SCUD 
missiles deep in Iraqi territory. 
2. Time-Sensitive Planning 
Time-sensitive mission planning refers to planning for 
the deployment and employment of designated forces and 
resources in response to an actual situation. This type of 
planning requires great flexibility and responsiveness. It 
demands the ability to meet changing situations with little 
time, possibly few resources, and only sketchy intelligence. 
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Contingency targeting and mission planning may be 
either deliberate or time-sensitive while crisis and combat 
mission planning are normally time-sensitive. Numerous 
small-scale operations (such as Operation Urgent Fury in 
Grenada, Operation Eagle Claw in Iran, and other NCA-
directed operations) are representative of time-sensitive 
operations. In other instances (such as Operation Just 
Cause in Panama) sufficient time may be available to conduct 
deliberate targeting and mission planning. 
Time-sensitive planning can be from the target 
or mission perspective, or both, (such as the recovery of 
downed aviators). A target may be classified as time-
sensitive when it requires an immediate response because it 
poses, or will pose, a threat to friendly forces or it is a 
highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity. Such 
targets can include Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBM), or targets which may lose their value quickly (such 
as a bridge being used for an enemy advance or withdrawal) . 
A mission can be time-sensitive when there is a small 
window of opportunity during which the objective of the 
mission can be accomplished. An example of this would be 
taking out radar sites before an air strike (as occurred in 
Operation Desert Storm) . The strikes cannot occur too 
42 
early because the radar could be fixed or repaired. On the 
other hand, if the attack on the sites is too late, friendly 
forces may be detected. Of critical interest today may be 
the SR of chemical and suspected nuclear facilities. 
Employment of SOF assets against time-sen~itive 
targets may be arduous. However, the very existence of SOF 
demands the ability to execute precision time-sensitive 
missions on short notice. No mission should be declared 
possible or impossible based primarily on time-sensitivity. 
Planners and commanders of operational units must weigh 
carefully and thoughtfully available resources and time 
against the probabilities of mission success and force 
survivability. 
Exercises run at the NTC and JRTC follow specific time 
guidelines to rehearse time-sensitive planning. SO 
execution planning for time-sensitive missions normally 
requires a minimum of 96 hours for basic plan development 
(or possible clarification of a preexisting plan), detailed 
war gaming of variations to the basic plan, and preparation 
of the tactical force to execute the mission. 30 While 
modern mission planning aids, such as advanced computer 
technology or combat modeling, may assist planners in this 
phase, such assistance cannot replace human analysis. 
30 See Joint Pub 3-05. 3, p. IV-4 and Joint Pub 3-05. 5 for detailed 
framework to ensure adequate execution planning. 
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D. TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING CYCLE 
The time-sensitive planning should begin at least 96 
hours before mission execution. There may be situations 
where the urgency of the mission (hostage rescue, 
evacuation, etc.,) does not allow for the prescribed 96 hour 
time frame. The Joint Force Special Operations Component 
Commander (JFSOCC) may decide the situation does not permit 
normal execution planning. In such cases, component 
commanders must determine the minimum essential preparation 
needed to complete assigned tasks in the time allotted. 
Component commanders inform the JFSOCC if mission 
preparation time causes an unacceptable degree of risk of 
mission failure. 
There are five phases prescribed in the time-sensitive 
planning cycle. These are: 
Phase 1: Objectives and Guidance 
Phase 2: Target Development 
Phase 3 : Weaponeering 
Phase 4: Force Selection 
Phase 5: Mission Planning 
Specifics for time-sensitive planning, found in.Joint 
Publication 3-05.5., are found in Appendices C and D: Time-
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sensitive Planning Cycle and Targeting Diagram; and Time-
Sensitive Mission Planning. 
E. ARSOA MJ:SSJ:ON PLANNING 
Joint doctrine details SO mission planning as it 
applies to the actions of the COMSOC during theater-level 
planning, and to the oversight of detailed tactical actions 
assigned to subordinate SOF elements. The 3-05 Joint 
Publication series does not discuss tactical mission 
planning such as air route selection, application of 
specialized equipment, or specific contingencies on the 
objective. These dynamics are left to the specific 
services and the unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) . 
The Joint Publications do identify, however, when tactical 
mission planning should occur. 
Tactical mission planning, whether deliberate or time-
sensitive, maintains mutual principals. Regardless of 
whether the MPA has only 96 hours to plan a time-sensitive 
mission during extended combat operations, or has months for 
deliberate mission planning where there is ample time to 
coordinate all facets of the mission (as was discussed in 
Operation Eagleclaw31 and Operation Kingpin in Chapter V) , 
31 0perati6n Eagleclaw was the heroic yet tragic attempt to rescue 
hostages at the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran on April 23-24, 1980. 
The mission was aborted due to the loss of helicopters and a C-130 
aircraft at a remote staging area, "Desert 1". 
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all planning should address courses of action (COA) , 
rehearsals, as well as identify required forces. When time 
is not a luxury, SOPs play a crucial role in streamlining 
the planning process. Decentralized planning by subordinate 
commanders is essential. Based on the SOC commander's 
mission guidance, subordinate SOF commanders must 
autonomously conduct their own mission planning within the 
scope of joint doctrine, streamlined by unit SOPs. 
ARSOA mission planning doctrine is found predominantly 
in the Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) at 
the battalion level, and in the Regimental Tactical Standard 
Operating Procedures (RTSOP) for the regiment. This 
inclusive document "delineates staff responsibilities and 
standardizes recurring operational and service support 
procedures for tactical deployment, execution of primary 
courses operational contingencies." 32 
As principally a supporting agency to SF, Rangers, and 
SEALs, ARSOA works closely with these supported assets by 
publishing the Regiment Mission Planning Guide (RMPG) . The 
RMPG is designed to provide premission planning guidance to 
ARSOA's supported commands. It addresses capabilities, 
missions, planning parameters, etc. The RMPG document is not 
intended to replace the ARSOA mission planner, but rather 
32 From the commander's introduction to the 160th Special Operations 
Aviation Regiment (Airborne) Tactical Standard Operating Procedures 
(RTSOP) . 
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augments the supported commands premission planning 
capabilities by detailing specifics which may assist them. 
ARSOA planning sequences occur in one of three 
sequences which support joint doctrine: deliberate planning, 
abbreviated planning or crisis planning. The distinctions 
between the three are based on the time availabile for 
planning. 
Deliberate planning is the method used when at home 
station, or at an Intermediate Support Base (ISB) with more 
than 24 hours available prior to mission execution. 
(Deliberate planning in joint doctrine prescribes a 96-hour 
cycle for planning) . The ARSOA deliberate planning sequence 
is based on a 72 hour time schedule where no more than 1/3 
of the planning time is available. 
Abbreviated planning method is exercised when there is 
less than 24 hours available prior to mission execution. 
This type of planning follows the same basic method as the 
deliberate planning process but stresses rapid, concurrent 
mission analysis, staff estimates, and COA development. 
Again, staff planners are allotted no more than 1/3 of the 
available planning time. 
Crisis planning is applied when immediate mission 
execution is required within 4 hours or less. This type of 
reactive planning underscores rapid "mental" mission 
analysis and preparation of verbal orders. The critical 
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node of this type of planning is decentralization - quickly 
conducting mission analysis at the battalion level and 
issuing orders to the Air Mission Commander (AMC) for 
detailed planning. 
F. COA FORMULATJ:ON 
This part of the thesis addresses planning with combat 
simulation, and looks at specific planing details coupled 
with how they can support ARSOA mission planning. This 
section leads into Chapter V where a historical case study 
is used to detail possible roles of combat simulation. 
1. Tactical Decision Making Process 
Generally, ARSOA uses a systematic Tactical Decision 
Making Process (TDMP) to carefully assess its mission, to 
develop COAs and to produce combat orders. The TDMP 
facilitates effective and timely mission analysis through 
application of professional knowledge, logic and judgment. 
Principles in FM 101-5 are used to enhance staff 
effectiveness in this inquiry. 
TDMP basically consists of recognizing and defining 
problems associated with the mission. Brainstorming is 
essential in this phase of the mission since it precedes the 
analysis segment of the planning where combat simulation is 
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most essential. Facts must be gathered and valid 
assumptions explored to determine the scope of the problem. 
Based on the outcome of this exercise, solutions are 
developed and each solution analyzed. Each solution is 
carefully examined and the best resolution sel~cted for 
utilization. 
The combat simulation systems expert, along with 
intelligence analysts, begins to build the terrain data at 
this pahse of the planning process. Depending on specific 
information available, they can begin building the situation 
map. A detailed map study of the area of operation (AO) and 
specific target areas is detailed. When digitized terrain 
of the AO itself is used, (versus other terrain used which 
is similar to the AO) , conjecture on line of sight 
capabilities is largely eliminated. 
Databases for both enemy and friendly forces can be 
checked to verify system characteristics. For example, COAs 
dependent on specific enemy threat platforms together with 
their weapons' ranges and locations can be tested before and 
during COA development. This testing is demonstrated in 
Chapter V. 
49 
2. COA Analysis 
ARSOA tactical planning staffs analyze COAs to 
determine strengths and weaknesses by using detailed war 
gaming. Staff and commander's war gaming follow a COA from 
start to finish to ascertain advantages and disadvantages as 
well as other considerations. This type of war gaming 
relies heavily on tactical judgment and experience. This 
step-by-step process focuses the planning staff and 
commander on each phase of the operation. 
COAs which are suitable and feasible are compared with 
the use of a decision matrix. The decision matrix evaluates 
the COAs by use of the following criteria (which is 
sometimes weighted based on relative importance) : 
• Risk: Ability to accomplish the mission with the 
minimum required personnel and equipment. 
• Objective: Focuses on the stated mission and 
accomplishes commander's intent. 
• Implicitness: Clear, uncomplicated plan. 
• Flexibility: Ability to retain freedom of maneuver. 
• Sustainability: Ability to man, arm, fuel, fix and 
protect the force. 
After the complete and thorough evaluation of all COAs, 
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staffs give the commander a decision brief and recommend a 
particular COA. The commander may accept the recommend-
ation, modify it, or select another. 
G. PLANNING WITH COMBAT SIMULATION 
Use of combat simulation in both deliberate and time-
sensitive mission planning presents a perplexing paradox. 
Deliberate planning, as described in joint documents, 
affords ample time for mission planners to utilize combat 
simulation to optimize COA analysis, route selection, and so 
forth. However, the greatest benefit may be using a 
simulation in time-sensitive planning. Granted, time is 
always limited. Yet the benefits of its unique 
applications, in the capable hands of those who understand 
its potential benefits, may help overcome time deficits and 
the frictions and fog of war (Clausewitz) which often 
accompany combat situations. 
Chapter V is the link between the concept of combat 
modeling and its incorporation into ARSOA mission planning. 
It begins with simulation requirements, in the most generic 
sense, for planners to utilize modeling to its fullest 
extent. A brief discussion of combat modeling's application 
in an historical case study, the Son Tay Raid, will 
highlight simulation capabilities. This specific case study 
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was chosen because of its heavy rotary wing use, joint 
planning emphasis, and "elegant simplistic" plans 
formulation performed by NCA staff members all the way down 
to the raiding warriors. 
The focus of Chapter V is on the application of combat 
simulation and crucial "what if" 33 sensitivity-type 
questions for actions on the objective. 
33 See John A. Battilega & Judith K. Grange, The Military Applications 
of Modeling, (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH:Air Force Institute 
Technology Press, 1984) p. 8. "What if" questions can be used to 
explore the possible consequences of a wide variety of courses of action 
which are open to allies and adversaries; and they can be used to 
explore the implications of constraints imposed by physics, by tactics, 
by politics, or by resource limits. 
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V. COMBAT MODELING AND "OPERATION KINGPIN" 
"[War] No other human activity is so 
continuously or universally bound up with 
chance" 
Carl von Clausewitz 
from On War 
"From Plato to NATO, the history of command 
in war consists essentially of an endless 
~est for certainty- certainty about the state 
and intentions of the enemy's forces; certainty 
about the manifold factors that together 
constitute the environment in which war is 
fought ... ; and, last but definitely not least, 
certainty about the state, intentions, and 
activities of one's own forces." 
Martin Van Creveld 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It does not matter how meticulous a plan is conceived, 
organized and implemented, there will always be a degree of 
uncertainty involved in the final outcome. Aircraft break, 
unexpected weather develops, threats do not behave as 
templated; communication falters and gaps in intelligence 
hinder thorough mission preparation and give rise to 
assumptions. Assumptions that are based on experience, 
knowledge and often pure intuition, can help fill 
intellectual holes in the planning process, but they may 
also give a totally false perspective. Such calculated 
risks and "chances" that ARSOA takes to support SOF 
hallmarks its willingness to adapt to the frict~ons of SO. 
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One of Carl von Clausewitz's consistent themes is that 
war is the province of chance, and chance offers up 
opportunities as well as presenting opposition. (An 
interesting note highlighting this Clausewitzian concept is 
the Chinese ideograph for "crisis" which is made up of two 
characters, one meaning "catastrophe or danger" and the 
other "opportunity".) 34 
The implementation of combat modeling can help fill the 
intellectual voids and fuzzy assumptions often found in SO 
planning. No SO mission has all the information necessary 
for planners to prepare completely with one hundred percent 
confidence. As you will see in the discussion of the Son 
Tay Raid, planners utilized the most sophisticated 
intelligence gathering technology available at the time and 
still had to assume away some concerns, like the existence 
of American POWs in the compound. 
This chapter demonstrates the application of combat 
modeling in ARSOA mission planning by exploring the 1970 
raid on the Son Tay POW camp located on the outskirts of 
Hanoi in North Vietnam. Planners had months to prepare, 
rehearse and execute the mission. Yet many questions went 
unanswered. Are there prisoners still remaining in the 
34 Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortune, the Anatomy of 
Failure in War, (New York: Vintage Books, 1991) p. 239. 
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camp? How many? Should an agent be infiltrated into the 
area to verify the existence of American servicemen? 
Many variables are at play in such a high-stakes SO 
mission. Combat simulation can help streamline course of 
action (COA) selection and assist in war gaming actions on 
the objective. There are other uses which can be inferred, 
but for simplification and demonstrative purposes in this 
chapter, actions on the objective will be discussed in 
detail. 
B. PRESUMPTIONS 
Prior to applying combat modeling in a planning 
scenario, it is important to satisfy basic requirements 
before its employment by ARSOA mission planners or MPAs. 
The following prerequisites are assumed to exist for 
purposes of discussion in this chapter. 
1. Database 
The database must be complete, accurate, and detailed 
prior to mission planning. Emphasis must be placed on 
accurate systems, weapons and sensor characteristics prior 
to mission application. SO missions often employ unique 
systems depending on the situation. Time may not always be 
55 
available to manipulate the database during scenario 
analysis, especially during time-sensitive planning. 
2. Systems Analyst/Combat Model Specialist 
The key to successful implementation of combat modeling 
is the availability and employment of a systems specialist 
adept at understanding the mathematical algorithms, as well 
as the capabilities and intricate operation of the combat 
simulation. While it should be the commander's goal to 
train military planners and staff members to manage and 
apply the simulation, there are great long-term rewards in 
using a systems expert. Case in point: Janus does not model 
underwater SEAL operations realistically due to limited 
maritime parameters. A current study modeling the 
interaction of Navy SEALs and mine countermeasures had to be 
manipulated by the modeler/system specialist because Janus 
does not realistically represent underwater operations. So 
the modeler had to change the database in order for 
underwater swimmers to actually move one meter above the 
water. Despite the swimmers swimming one meter above water, 
the modeler adjusted the threat parameters so that the enemy 
above water could not see the frogmen. The underlying 
assumption was that the frogmen never broke the surface of 
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the water. Such management by systems experts can be 
utilized to overcome systems deficiencies and to allow for 
analytical creativity. 35 
System managers do posses manipulative powers, yet they 
must act as "honest brokers" and maintain realistic and 
undefiled databases. The database must remain free of over-
inflated claims by those who feel certain weapon systems are 
not functioning properly or outcomes of sensitivity runs 
that are not according to their expectations. 
3. Intelligence 
Intelligence analysts play a major role in the 
tactical development of combat simulation scenarios. The 
more current and complete is the information available, the 
more valuable the evaluations will be. Without templating 
threat assets and their possible interaction with friendly 
forces, little information can be garnered from the 
scenario. 
4. Terrain Files 
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) digitized terrain files, 
employed by Janus, must be readily available, especially in 
35 Current research being conducted by LCDR Bob Wilson on SEAL maritime 
mine operations at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
Research to be published in 1997. 
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short-fuse, time-sensitive mission planning. Systems 
experts or responsible staff members must be proactive in 
preparing terrain data usable for planning. Preferably, the 
terrain should be loaded into the system. Similar terrain 
can be used in lieu of actual terrain, but this substitution 
impairs the analysis data. 
5. Mission Types 
ARSOA missions in support of DA, SR, and Counter 
Terrorism {CT) seem best suited for combat modeling. Other 
missions such as Foreign Internal Defense {FID) modeling are 
not yet developed enough for accurate and systematic 
validation. 
C • PLANNING WITH COMBAT SIMULATION 
In the following case, combat simulation could have 
been used in a multitude of areas. Air routes from the 
raiders' staging base in Thailand to Son Tay and return 
could have been modeled to determine route selection and 
effectiveness against the heavy North Vietnamese radar 
coverage. A commander's decision to attempt a mission may 
be influenced by the location of radar detection. The 
locations and time of engagements resulting in losses can 
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allow planners to evaluate whether risks are acceptable, and 
perhaps how to overcome the problematic areas and critical 
nodes of the mission. 
Another combat simulation use could have been the 
selection of weapons, ranges, and most effective locations 
for the final assault. For example, beginning at the 
weapon's specific maximum range under the conditions 
representative of those at the actual time of the assault, 
the firing range can be decreased by appropriate increments 
and the respective effect on the probability of hit and kill 
recorded. 
The combat simulation can only extrapolate those 
aspects it has been programmed to consider. Detailed 
replication in the database of the simulation of the actual 
terrain, vegetation, buildings, and so forth, must 
correspond with the actual terrain on the ground. If it 
does not, a planned firing position or landing zone may not 
be useful when the operational element arrives on the actual 
objective. 
1. Repetitive Scenario Runs 
To fully understand the probabilistic nature of 
warfare, more than one run of any given scenario is 
required. Multiple runs are required to determine recurrent 
·~ 
tendencies and to dismiss outlying anomalies. If it is 
agreed that battle is probabilistic and indeterminate 
factors will not repeat themselves exactly, then the need 
for multiple evaluations of a strategy is required. When 
intricate missions are planned and rehearsed, planners and 
participants conduct multiple rehearsals to determine and 
distinguish uncertainty in the mission. A single rehearsal 
cannot identify every problematic issue. The outcome in the 
first rehearsal run may be totally different from the fifth 
or tenth trials. Probabilistic combat simulation requires 
the same repetition. 
2. Time Deliberation 
Repetitive runs and scenario development demand time. 
Presupposing the systems analyst is knowledgeable of the 
simulation, that intelligence and order of battle (OB) are 
available for both friendly and enemy forces, a mission 
scenario development (like that of the following detailed 
Son Tay Raid) may take anywhere from 6-10 hours. This time 
includes loading the appropriate terrain files, building the 
systems (i.e. helicopters with appropriate weapons systems, 
ground components with associated personal weapons), 
insuring probability of hit (PH) and probability of kill 
(PK) data is properly applied, and the proper use of the 
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line of sight (LOS) and VIEW functions to tactically apply 
systems prudently within the context of the known 
intelligence. The more sides being modeled, the longer the 
simulation runs will take. 
Rudimentary route applications in given SGenarios can 
be applied in minutes if detailed turns, stops and timed 
stops are not required. Precise routes can be modeled in as 
little as 15 to 20 minutes. Timed indirect fires and 
artillery assaults can be constructed in about the same 
amount of time. 
In the Son Tay scenario runs, the first two minutes 
were performed at real-time speed. This was to initiate the 
DISMOUNT application of the raiders and to put them in 
SPRINT mode. The final 26 minutes of each run was performed 
at 20 times the normal speed to allow for multiple runs. 
The faster speeds do not degrade the detailed analysis of 
the run. 
The following scenario serves as an example of the link 
between combat simulation and ARSOA mission planning. 
Actions on the objective, the primary focus of most mission 
planning, will be the focus in this study. 36 The raiders in 
this SO had no room for error. 
36 The data collected for this case study is in no way exhaustive but 
serves as an example of the capabilities of combat simulation. 
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D. THE SON TAY RAID 
In 1968, over 350 American servicemen were held captive 
in North Vietnamese prisoner of war (POW) camps. By 1970, 
more than fourteen hundred servicemen were prisoners or 
missing in action (MIA) in Southeast Asia. One facility, 
Camp Hope, located 23 miles northwest of Hanoi, held fifty-
five American POWs. In May 1970, U.S. intelligence sources 
discovered a coded message near this camp spelling out the 
total number of American captives and the location of a 
possible extraction site near the camp. Air Force Lt.Col. 
Larry Chesley (Ret.) was moved into Son Tay (Camp Hope) the 
day before Thanksgiving 1968. According to Lt.Col. Chesley, 
Son Tay was a wretched place to try to exist. It had bad 
water, was always wet "and just a miserable place to 
live." 37 He indicated that the POWs in Son Tay often would 
dry their laundry in the letters P.O.W. and other code 
letters. 
American intelligence authorities immediately forwarded 
this information to general officers in charge of special 
operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for 
operational consideration. On August 8, 1970, after careful 
deliberation, the JCS approved formation of a joint 
37 Personal interview with Lt.Col. (Ret.) Larry Chesley on October 31, 
1996. Lt.Col. Chesley spent almost seven years in nine different POW 
camps in North Vietnam. He was shot down 16 April 1966 and was released 
12 February 1973. Lt.Col. Chesley is the author of Seven Years in Hanoi 
(Salt lake City: Bookcraft, 1973) 
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contingency task force to begin to formulate plans to rescue 
the captive Americans believed to be held in Camp Hope. 
Operation Kingpin (the final name of the operation) had 
begun. 
President Richard Nixon found himself in g political 
dilemma. Domestic forces, including families of servicemen 
held as POWs and those presumed MIA were playing into the 
hands of war protesters who opposed any involvement in 
Southeast Asia and Nixon's pro-involvement policies. Nixon 
wanted to end the war by finishing it with victory and 
honor. The possibility of snatching American POWs in North 
Vietnam proved tantalizing to Nixoni anything to relieve the 
pressure the American people were placing on him to end the 
war at almost any cost. 
Nixon's pro-military stance supported the possibility 
of a rescue attempt. His military advisors did not have to 
perform a "hard sell." The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, in his presentation to 
Nixon, later explained: 
I felt very strong that if we could get some of 
the POWs back home and let them circulate it would 
enable us to explain about the torture [and other 
abuse the POWs suffered]. The American people, 
who had been whipped up by the press, which was 
getting much of its information from Hanoi ... 
would then have understood. This would have made 
it easier to eventually free the other POWs .... 
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What I was hoping for was what took place after 
the Christmas 1972 bombing of North Vietnam. The 
boys would have come home after Son Tay. 38 
Not only would the "boys" be freed, but the North 
Vietnamese would learn a hard lesson, leaving them uncertain 
and apprehensive about further U.S. action. 
Admiral Moorer selected Brigadier General Leroy J. 
Manor, United States Air Force, commander of special 
operations forces at Eglin Air Force Base, to be the JTF 
commander. Colonel Arthur D. Simons was selected as his 
second in command, a United States Army 30-year professional 
and a veteran of three wars, 39 who was highly regarded as a 
special operator with a vast amount of experience in 
Vietnam. 
Brigadier General Manor received clear and precise 
guidance from Moorer as to the direction he could take the 
task force: "You have the authority to put together a task 
force and train that task force. "40 Manor immediately 
assembled the best helicopter pilots he could find. Some 
were returned to Florida from Southeast Asia to participate 
38Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: 
Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: 
1993) p.54. 
Special Operations as a 
Oxford University Press, 
39 John G. Hubbell, POW, A Definite History of the American Prisoner -
of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964 -1973 (New York: Reader's Digest 
Press, 1976) p. 537. 
40William H. McRaven, Spec Ops, Case Studies in Special Operations 
Warfare: Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995) p. 289. 
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in the operation. Colonel Simons personally recruited 
highly capable and experienced soldiers for the task force 
from the ranks of the John F. Kennedy Center for Special 
Warfare at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Over 250 men 
eventually volunteered from which Simons personally chose 
120 of them as the nucleus of the ground assault force. All 
but three of these men had already served a couple of tours 
in Vietnam. Once chosen, all the selected volunteers were 
taken to Duke Field (in the vicinity of Eglin Air Force 
Base, Florida) to begin training as a unit. 
The training began on August 20 and ended on November 8, 
1970. During this training period, regularly scheduled 
joint meetings were also held to plan the logistics and 
training activities. Intelligence continued to be funneled 
from Washington to the task force including photos of Son 
Tay and the proposed routes into and from the objective. 
Intelligence and security proved to be key elements for 
keeping the element of surprise in the hands of the task 
force raiders. Because of the large quantities of 
information needed to insure some degree of success, other 
U.S. agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and National Security 
Agency (NSA), were basically co-opted to provide the 
required intelligence. 
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The task force was billeted in a cantonment area near 
Eglin AFB but isolated from the main base. The physical 
isolation of the unit proved essential in their "joint" 
training. None of the core operators knew what the mission 
would entail (the vast majority of the task fo~ce was 
briefed on November 18, 1970, two days prior to mission 
execution.) 41 Over 170 rehearsals were conducted during the 
next four months, many of which were full-dress rehearsals. 
The aviation rehearsals included more than 284 sorties and 
over 1000 total fight hours, mostly at night. 
Every person, whether pilot or ground assault member, 
knew the duties of the other men. All outcome contingencies 
had been raised and analyzed countless times. Each 
participant fully understood the role he was to play and 
there was no room for anything but professional performance. 
Each participant was made fully aware of the goal of the 
mission. Lieutenant Colonel Elliot P. Sydnor, the Deputy 
Commander stated later, "the mission statement was clearly 
written to include the phrase 'To forcibly release and 
extract the prisoners.' I liked the word 'forcibly' as it 
provided a lot of flexibility in the use of force against 
the enemy . "42 
41 MSGT McMullin (Ret.) counters Schemmer's assertion that the raiders 
became raucous when they found out where they were actually going 
(Schemmer, p. 159). In a personal interview McMullin stated that the 
raiders applauded when Simons claimed there would be no escape and 
evasion, that the raiders would stay and fight. 
42 Ibid., p. 329. 
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Brigadier General Manor, the JTF commander, had mission 
autonomy throughout all phases of the organizational 
buildup, training, and execution. He built redundancy into 
the mission execution phase so that the mission could 
proceed should any contingency arise (such as helicopter(s) 
malfunctioning) . "Blue Plan," "Green Plan," and "Red Plan" 
were all rehearsed numerous times in case the need should 
arise. All the operators could switch to each plan without 
a moment's hesitation. 
To overcome problems inherently associated when two 
different forces work together, Manor "emphasized the 
importance a of completely joint and unified approach to 
every facet of this complex operation." He later stated: 
"This was viewed as essential and was insisted upon 
throughout planning I training and employment. "43 Master 
Sergeant Kenneth E. McMullin (Ret.), a member of the assault 
force which "crash landed" into the Son Tay compound, 
emphasized the joint planning of the operation. "I was told 
one day to grab my assault gear and head to a waiting UH-1 
helicopter. We took off and I thought that we would be 
going on another training ride." 
MSG McMullin stated that the UH-1 slipped into 
formation with a C-130 aircraft, and the Army pilots then 
43Vandenbroucke, pp. 60-61. 
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tried basically to hover inches above the C-130 while 
traveling faster than 100 knots in an attempt to see if the 
UH-1 could draft along with the massive transport aircraft! 
Despite numerous tries to explore the possibilities of using 
a UH-1 as the platform to assault the compoundr an Air Force 
HH-3 helicopter was selected instead of the Army 
helicopter. 44 Such joint effort was the hallmark of this 
mission. 
The execution of this elegantly simplistic plan (in a 
similar manner in which professional athletes make their 
occupations look simple to the average Sunday afternoon arm-
chair-quarterback) was flawless. The helicopters in 
conjunction with the assault force performed remarkably 
well, interdicting overlapping radars which were known to be 
the most complex and dangerous in the world (see Figure 6). 
Aerial refueling went perfectly, as did the U.S. Naval air 
diversion over Hanoi which involved hundreds of aircraft 
launched from two diversionary aircraft carrier groups. 
As the helicopter assault force, led by an Air Force 
C-130, closed on Son Tay, one HH-53 helicopter carrying 
Simons' support element mistakenly landed 400 meters south 
of its "planned" objective, while the lead HH-53 helicopter 
brought down the two guard towers in the compound with a 
44Personal interview with MSG Kenneth E. McMullin (Ret.) on 24 July 
1996. 
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stream of mini-gun fire. The HH-3, with the 14-man assault 
element, crashed into the compound with a layer of 
mattresses on the floor to cushion the impact. The support 
element landed safely to the south of the compound (see 
Figure 7). 
The compound Simons' support element mistakenly 
assaulted, that looked similar to the Son Tay camp, housed a 
group of non-Vietnamese advisors and support personnel. 
"Green Plan" (loss of one helicopter) was immediately put 
into effect when the security group leader realized Simons 
was not there. After the helicopter returned 9 minutes 
later to pick up the support force, Simons' 22-man assault 
element had liquidated the inhabitants of the mistaken 
I 
objective45 , they returned to the Son Tay compound where the 
remainder of the force found there were no prisoners to be 
rescued. They were moved to other camps months earlier. 
Within 26 minutes of arrival, the entire force had 
reassembled, and departed with only one minor injury. 
Despite heavy surface to air missile (SAM) threats, the 
entire raiding force safely returned to their staging base 
in Thailand. Two days later, the task force returned to the 
United States and was disbanded. 
45 Benjamin F. Schernmer in The Raid claims that Bull Simons' 22 men 
killed between 100 and 200 of these soldiers. Simons' men noted that 
these men were much taller than most Orientals, between "5 feet 10 
inches to 6 feet Orientals tall, not wearing the normal NVA dress, but 
instead T-shirts and fitted dark undershorts." P. 171. 
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E. APPLICATION OF COMBAT SIMULATION 
There are a myriad of variables which planners could 
look at when analyzing any operation. Since the fundamental 
element of surprise was so critical to mission success, let 
us look at the possible outcomes had the element ol surprise 
been taken from the raiders when assaulting the objective. 
Surprise was such an essential part of the operational plan, 
it gave the required "relative superiority" 46 that was 
crucial to the success of the raiders. 
Mission planners staged the assault on the compound to 
happen between guard shift rotations. Without the element 
of surprise, many of the POWs probably would not have 
survived. What happens if the raiders had attacked without 
surprise? The following illustrative scenarios are 
possible. Planners could explore these scenarios when 
analyzing courses of action (COAs) to be taken on the 
objective. 
A cursory description is given for each of the 
scenarios together with the assumptions made for the mini-
study. There will be at least five simulation runs 
conducted for each scenario. In the data tables, each 
46 McRaven in Spec Ops describes relative superiority as "a condition 
that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive 
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Figure 6: Route of the Son Tay Raid Force 
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Figure 8: Secondary School Overhead View (From JCS) 
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scenario run will be analyzed according to the loss of both 
friendly and enemy forces, or assault helicopters. 
Conclusions based on an analysis of the basic findings are 
then presented. These "discoveries" can be the basis for 
further investigations. 
1. Scenario "1" - Entire Assault Force 
In this mini-study, the 56-man raiding force assaults 
the compound and does not split its force into a blocking 
element to cover the southern avenues of approach. 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
1. The raiding force does not have the element of 
surprise. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) guard force 
numbers 44 men who are armed with small arms, and who 
are alert, attentive and well prepared. 
2. All U.S. aircraft infiltrate and exfiltrate without 
incident. 
3. The secondary school to the south is not occupied. 
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Five runs were made of this scenario, resulting in the 
following data: 
Enemy Raider 
RUN Losses Percent Losses Percent 
(Total of loss (Total of loss 
44 NVA) 56 Raiders) 
Run 1 30 68% 2 4% 
Run 2 23 52% 3 5% 
Run 3 31 70% 9 16% 
Run 4 34 77% 13 23% 
Run 5 32 73% 9 16% 
Conclusions: Friendly losses appear to be "acceptable" 
within the context of such a dangerous mission. In this 
scenario, the lack of surprise appears to be overcome by the 
lethality of the full force on the compound. 
In the next scenario we consider how the outcome of the 
mission might have been affected if a blocking force had 
split the raiders' firepower by taking up blocking positions 
to the south. 
2. Scenario "2" - Split Assault Force 
In this mini-study, a 22-man blocking force must cross 
open fields to assume blocking positions approximately 200 
meters to the south. 
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ASSUMPTIONS: 
1. The raiders do not have the element of surprise. 
2. All aircraft infiltrate and exfiltrate without 
incident. 
3. The secondary school to the south does not pose a 
threat. 
Five runs were made of this scenario resulting in the 
following data: 
Enemy Raider 
RUN Losses Percent Losses Percent loss 
(Total of loss (Total of 
44 NVA) 56 Raiders) 
Run 1 22 50% 22 39% 
Run 2 18 41% 14 25% 
Run 3 18 41% 28 50% 
Run 4 20 45% 28 50% 
Run 5 22 50 35 63% 
Conclusions: The apparent splitting of the assault 
forces proves to be devastating to the raiders. Since the 
blocking element (22 men from Simons' support group) must 
cross over open fields to get to their positions after 
dismounting from the aircraft, they come under heavy small 
arms fire. This requires the blocking force to disengage to 
assume their planned positions. Consequently, raider 
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losses are much heavier and the enemy losses are much 
lighter. This is consistent with a "divide-and-conquer" 
paradigm. 
3. Scenario "3" - Secondary School Clash 
In this scenario, the raiding force assaults the 
compound, and the blocking force assumes its planned 
positions (approximately 200 meters to the south) but must 
now contend with 100 NVA located at the secondary school. 
These NVA47 are alerted when the first helicopter flies over 
their compound which it has mistaken for Son Tay. About six 
minutes after the fly over, the first NVA elements of the 
secondary school head up the road with small arms to assist 
the NVA at Son Tay (approximately 400 meters to the north) . 
Simons' blocking group confronts the secondary school 
elements. 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
1. The raiders do not have the element of surprise. 
2. All aircraft infiltrate and exfiltrate without 
incident. 
3. The secondary school to the south does poses a 
threat. 
47 The acronym "NVA" is used for lack of a better term. There is no 
open source documentation as to their definitive identity. 
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Eight runs were made of this scenario resulting in the 
following data: 
RUN Enemy Losses Percent loss Raider Losses Percent 
(Total of (Total of 56 loss 
144 NVA) Raiders) 
Run 1 19 13% 56 100% 
Run 2 32 22% 53 95% 
Run 3 69 48% 43 77% 
Run 4 50 35% 30 54% 
Run 5 61 42% 41 73% 
Run 6 65 45% 37 66% 
Run 7 47 33% 47 84% 
Run 8 34 24% 41 73% 
Conclusions: Despite the blocking force being in 
position to confront the threat from the south, the apparent 
combination of disbursing the assault force on the objective 
coupled with having to fight the 100-man NVA relief force 
from the south, proves devastating in casualties among the 
raiders. The NVA losses averaged from the eight runs 
totaled 33% while the 78% average raider losses were 
catastrophic. 
4. Scenario "4" - Aircraft Losses 
Scenario Four is the same as Scenario Three except the 
aircraft are susceptible to enemy small arms fire (machine 
gun and AK-4 7) . 
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ASSUMPTIONS: 
1. The raiders do not have the element of surprise. 
2. All aircraft infiltrations and exfiltrations are 
susceptible to small arms fire. 
3. The secondary school to the south poses a threat. 
Fifteen runs were made of this scenario (because of its 
complexity), resulting in the following data: 
RUN Aircraft Enemy Percent Raider Percent 
Losses losses losses losses losses 
HH3/HH53 (144 Total) (56 Total) 
Run 1 1-HH3 82 57% 52 93% 
Run 2 0 97 67% 39 70% 
Run 3 2-HH53 76• 53% 42 75% 
Run 4 1-HH3 83 58% 44 78% 
Run 5 1-HH53 68 47% 51 91% 
Run 6 2-HH53 72 50% 46 82% 
Run 7 0 73 51% 42 75% 
Run 8 0 63 44% 46 82% 
Run 9 0 100 69% 45 80% 
Run 10 1-HH3 81 56% 46 82% 
Run 11 1-HH3&HH53 66 46% 49 87% 
Run 12 1-HH3 69 48% 41 73% 
Run 13 0 73 51% 48 86% 
Run 14 1-HH3 66 46% 38 68% 
Run 15 0 72 50% 38 68% 
Conclusions: According to this analysis, .08 percent 
aircraft losses can be expected along with 2.4 crew members. 
The NVA lost 76 men on the average or about 53%. Raider 
attrition averaged 44 men or 79% of the ground force. 
In the next two scenarios, commanders and planners are 
concerned with the survivability of aircraft if they should 
encounter weapons fire other than from the expected small 
arms. In Scenario Five, An RPG gunner with another enemy 
soldier equipped with an AK-47 are in two separate towers. 
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Planners also wonder during this investigation, what might 
occur if the RPG/AK-47 teams are hidden. 
5. Scenario usu - Aircraft vs. RPG Teams in 
Towers 
In this scenario, planners want to see the impact of 
RPGs on the assault helicopters. Two RPG teams, each with 
an AK-47 gunner, are situated in 10-meter towers in the 
compound. The towers overlook a bridge to the north and a 
road intersection to the south. 
Assumptions: 
1. The enemy RPG/AK-47 teams are alert but do not 
anticipate an air threat. Thus surprise is on the side 
of the approaching helicopters. 
2. The aircraft are susceptible to the RPGs and small 
arms fire. The air crews are poised to interdict the 
RPG/AK-47 teams. 
3. There is no threat from the secondary school forces 
to the south. 
In this scenario, five runs were made of the scenario 
resulting in the following data: 
RUN Aircraft Fatalities Fatalities 
(1 HH3/3 HH53) RPG/AK-47 Teams ( 2) 
(1 RPG/1 AK-47) EA. 
Run 1 0 2 RPGs, 1 AK-47 
Run 2 0 2 RPGs, 1 AK-47 
Run 3 0 1 RPGs, 1 AK-47 
Run 4 0 2 RPGs 
Run 5 0 2 RPGs, 1 AK-47 
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Conclusions: The aircraft were poised to take out the 
towers and may have been prepared for the possibility of 
weapons other than small arms. As the aircraft approached 
the compound from the south, they were searching for, and 
ready to engage, any threat. On the other hand, the NVA 
teams in the towers were slower to react due to their wide 
and slow search patterns: they were not expecting aircraft 
to fly into and near the compound. 
Next let's see what happens if the teams were not in 
the towers as expected by the raiding force. How would this 
then affect aircraft infiltrations and exfiltrations? 
6. Scenario "6" - Aircraft vs. Hidden RPG Teams 
In this final demonstrative scenario, the RPG/AK-47 
teams are placed in the compound with very low profiles. 
Aircraft are nearly on top of them prior to recognizing 
their existence. 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
1. Surprise is on the side of the raiders. 
2. The aircraft are susceptible to the RPGs and small 
arms fire. 
3. The air crews are poised to interdict the RPG/AK-47 
teams. 
4. There is no threat from the secondary school forces 
to the south. 
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Five runs were made of this scenario, resulting in the 
following data: 
RUN Aircraft Fatalities Fatalities 
(1 HH3/3 HH53) RPG/AK-47 Teams ( 2) 
(1 RPG/1 AK-47) EA. 
Run 1 Lead HH53 killed 1 AK-47 
Run 2 Trail HH53 killed 1 AK-47 
Run 3 HH3 killed 1 RPGs, 2 AK-47 
Run 4 HH3 killed 1 RPG 
Run 5 HH3 killed 1 RPG 
Conclusions: The aircraft had a difficult time 
detecting and acquiring the RPGs in the compound. By the 
time the aircraft sensors did acquire them, the aircraft 
were on top of their positions. 
F. SUMMARY 
These scenarios provide illustrative examples of the 
potential uses of combat simulation in planning, allowing 
planners to see the effects of changing many variables. In 
the actual Son Tay raid the secondary school (located about 
400 meters to the south) was assumed not to be a threat to 
the assaulting force. In retrospect, it was extremely 
fortuitous for the raiders that Simons accidentally landed 
at and liquidated the threat in the compound. From our 
study in Scenario Four, had the forces housed there been 
allowed to become factors in the fighting at the Son Tay POW 
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compound, the outcome could have been totally different (and 
even disasterous to the raiders) 
How different the outcome may have been if surprise had 
been sacrificed and had not been a beneficial tool for the 
raiders. Without the element of surprise, as ~xemplified in 
the scenarios, the tactically successful mission (successful 
infiltration, exfiltration, minor injury to one raider and 
safe return to staging base of the entire assault force) 
could have been another dismal POW rescue failure with the 
distinct possibility of adding "raiders" to the growing 
number of captured POWs in North Vietnam. 48 The outcome of 
the mission could have been totally different had RPGs been 
in the compound (as seen in Scenario Six) . The raiders were 
prepared to take the towers out, but if the RPG teams had 
been hidden, the aircraft would have been extremely 
vulnerable and the outcome of the mission could be altered. 
48 The Son Tay rescue was not the first POW rescue attempt in Southeast 
Asia. It was actually the 71st "dry hole". In South Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos, 91 such rescue attempts were mounted between 1966 and 1970. 
At least 45 to 50 of them were triggered by reports of U.S. POWs. 
Seventy-nine of the operations involved outright "raids". Of the 91 
rescue operations, 20 succeeded in rescuing 318 South Vietnamese 
soldiers and civilians. But, of the 45 raids mounted to rescue American 
POWs, only one succeeded. Army Specialist Fourth Class Larry D. Aiken 
was rescued on July 10, 1969, from a Viet Cong POW camp, but he died in 
an American hospital 15 days later from wounds inflicted by his captors 
just before his rescue. The raid, had apparently been compromised at 
the last minute. 
Lt.Col. Chesley stated that despite the failure to rescue them, the 
attempt was the best thing anyone could have done for them. "It got us 
all together for the first time." 
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A prudent and judicious mix of combat simulation and 
human ingenuity can lead to discovery of the critical nodes 
in the execution of the mission. The heuristic application 
of combat modeling can allow commanders and staffs another 
method for learning possible outcomes through ~xploration. 
In this method or process, the answers to the obvious 
questions may not be as valuable as discovering unobtrusive, 
yet critical, questions requiring answers. 
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VI. FUTURE OF SOF MODELING 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
"All in all, the emerging world is likely to lack the 
clarity and stability of the cold war and to be a more 
junglelike world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, 
unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities.n 
Samuel P. Huntington 
The Greek poet Homer mused that the quest or the 
journey is the all-important goal in life, not mere arrival 
at the destination. Clausewitz's search lead him to 
continually search for answers to the question, "How can we 
analyze war?" 49 The pursuit continues today as special 
operations commanders, staffs, and planners strive to 
understand the critical variables which can curtail the 
success of the best planned special operations missions. 
The preceding chapter illustrated how combat simulation can 
be used in mission planning to explore variables affecting 
actions on the objective and weapon system's affects on 
aircraft performance. There are even more roles that combat 
simulation can fill within the SOF community. 
The following is a discussion of additional roles 
which combat simulation can play in the SOF arena. We also 
discuss some USSOCOM models used now and under future 
cosideration. Recommendations and conclusions then follow. 
49 See Peter Paret, "Clausewitz", Makers of Modern Strategy from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University 
Press) pp. 186-213. 
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A. ADDITIONAL COMBAT SIMULATION ROLES 
1. Historical Case Library 
Imagine a staff having access to a library of SO 
missions to be used for analysis as they prepare for future 
operations. 5° For example, The Son Tay Raid could have been 
used as a tool for planners in preparation for the rescue 
attempt of the hostages in Iran in 1980. Contrasting and 
comparing aspects of the actual mission could enlighten and 
allow planners to visually war game the mission. Details 
can be changed such as decreasing or adding personnel, 
platforms or weapons systems to gauge the outcome of the 
mission or affects on enemy forces. 
The USSOCOM J-5C modeled scenarios of the Task Force 
Ranger mission in Mogadishu and the SEAL mission at Patilla. 
Specific parameters of the model were altered to create 
historically accurate depictions. Such qualitative 
historical documentaries allow commanders, staffs, and 
planners to replay continually the operations and to perform 
examination as needed. 
5
°From discussions with Professor Gordon McCormick, Academic Advisor 
for the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) curriculum at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
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2. Electronic Sand Table 
Mission planners need to know, see, and understand the 
disposition of all friendly and enemy forces in the AO prior 
to mission planning. This situation map is used continually 
to deconflict air and ground routes, and to select COAs. It 
must be updated continually to maintain current order of 
battle. This is a time consuming task which invariably 
falls to the S-2 Intelligence Officer to insure the overlays 
are current, legible and precise. 
A high resolution combat simulation, such as Janus or 
the Joint Tactical Simulation (to be discussed later in this 
chapter), can take the place of the conventional situation 
map and overlays. Once the terrain file is loaded, all 
available information on friendly and enemy forces can be 
pulled from the database (maintained by a systems manager) 
and placed into a scenario file. Forces and equipment are 
identified by appropriate icons which can be easily modified 
to suit the needs of the user. This type of use is simple 
and falls within the "set-up" parameters of systems experts 
mission planners. The benefits can be substantial. 51 
The terrain graphics offer an extremely perceptible and 
up-to-date version of the area of operation. The area to be 
analyzed is at the discretion of the user. The resolution 
51 See Hakala, p. 4 7. 
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or detail, required by the user can be changed easily. The 
versatility of terrain analysis is remarkable. 
Sensor and detection capabilities can be "played" out 
to determine minimum and maximum visual ranges of personnel 
a·nd platforms. 
3. After Action Tool 
After Action Reviews (AAR) play an important part in 
the ARSOA planning and learning process. Lessons learned 
from each mission are invaluable for follow-on missions. 
The use of high resolution modeling allows debriefers to 
systematically (and visually) progress through all stages of 
mission execution: from the staging area, to air movement, 
to execution of actions at the objective and exfiltration, 
and return to the staging area. The actual mission actions 
can then be compared to those that were preplanned. 
Validation of the model can also occur when actual results 
of the mission are compared to predictions of the combat 
model. Post mission discussion can lead to additional COA 
analysis and effectiveness. 
4. War Gaming Tool 
An advantage of war gaming, compared to field 
exercises, is that it makes people think about war, without 
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the risk of losing lives or equipment. Using combat 
simulation with its inherent capability to replay scenarios 
repeatedly without expending vast amounts of time, resources 
or energy can benefit ARSOA. During war gaming, time can be 
compressed, stopped, or expanded to allow conc~ntration on 
critical nodes of concern or interest. War gaming through 
combat simulations can be played almost anywhere. Computer-
assisted war gaming can minimize exhaustive calculations and 
allow the players to focus on effects of specific decisions. 
Combat simulation war gaming can be extremely objective 
if data bases are unbiased. The capabilities of specific 
enemy threat, for example, cannot be degraded by opposing 
players to better affect the desired outcome. War garners 
must work within the honest and impartial parameters 
established by the honest broker; namely, the database 
manager. 
The emphasis of war gaming is on human interaction. It 
can be an extremely powerful learning tool. However, there 
are drawbacks to simulations. Lessons learned in war gaming 
will never take the place of actual combat experience. 
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke stated "nobody can actually 
duplicate the strain that a commander is under in making a 
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decision in combat. " 52 War gaming is not perfect, but it 
can "teach us what we didn' t know, we didn' t know. " 53 
s. Mission Preview 
Tactical mission planners are often the same as those 
leading operational missions. Such planners become intimate 
with the details and fine points of the mission. As 
planners and operators perform mission planning using combat 
simulation, combat planning becomes a mission preview 
exercise, allowing crews to preview mission execution prior 
to rehearsals or execution. 
Mission planning with combat simulation is an extremely 
fluid and logical process, with each element overlapping in 
chronological importance. Because the planner can see the 
scope of the plan and the critical junctions which may 
affect the outcome, he can focus on the critical portions of 
the mission during rehearsals. Like the Son Tay raider air 
crews who logged 1000 flight hours, 268 training sorties and 
rehearsed 170 times, the execution of the mission can become 
almost an extension of rehearsals (see Figure 9). 
52 Perla, Wargaming and its Uses, p. 2 50. 
53 Ibid., p. 284. 
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Figure 9: Mission Preview, Rehearsal, Execution 
Interrelationships 
There may be instances where time-sensitive mission planning 
does not afford the time to rehearse. Previewing the 
mission utilizing high resolution combat simulation can 
allow planners and operators some degree of premission 
visualization, war gaming and analysis. 
6. Order of Battle Database 
The database on a high resolution simulation allows 
multiple data entries for every piece of equipment, whether 
friendly or enemy. Rather than referring to manuals on 
enemy equipment or weapons systems to find attributes 
relevant to mission planning, .a simulation database can be 
used to store and file information in a categorized and 
easily accessible method. Also, weapon and sensor range 
capabilities can be visually depicted with a click of the 
mouse button rather than swinging arcs on a topographical 
situation map. The impact of terrain features is precisely 
calculated, not guessed. The process of developing such a 
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database may be time consuming, but the result would be a 
valuable mission planning tool. 54 
B. CURRENT USSOCOM MODELS 
Combat simulation presently utilized at USSOCOM is the 
Joint Tactical Simulation (JTS) . It was originally 
developed jointly by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army 
combining USAREUR's Urban Combat Computer Assisted Training 
System (UCCATS) and the U.S. Air Force's Security Exercise 
Evaluation System (SEES) into a single program. 55 
JTS provides SOF the capability to model explicitly 
SOF activities at a high resolution level. The primary 
focus is at the battalion level and below in conventional 
and unconventional urban warfare operations. The high 
resolution makes it a well-suited team/element training, 
especially in DA and Counter Terrorism (CT) missions. 
The JTS simulation can model ten sides simultaneously 
including civilians, refugees, terrorists, and partisan 
forces along with SOF. This ability alone makes it ideal 
for modeling complex SOF operations where numerous factions 
(such as were found in Somalia) have an impact on almost any 
operation. Multinational operations in Bosnia is yet 
another example of its potential viability. 
54 Hakala, p. 48. 
55 Special Operations Forces Simulations Catalogue, June 1995. 
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The high resolution of JTS makes it suitable for 
team/element training and planning, specially in DA and CT. 
Unlike the model used in this thesis, JTS is capable of 
modeling operators at various speeds (such as crawling, 
walking or running) as well as depicting stationary subjects 
either standing, crouching, or prone. 
In JTS, urban warfare is extremely realistic. This is 
not so surprising given that the conception and birth of JTS 
was a result of the need to model urban warfare in Europe. 
JTS allows simulation of combat in breaching of, and 
infiltration into, buildings and allows for vehicles to 
enter buildings. It can also model air assets from take-off 
to landing with multiple speed and altitude variations. 
Another high resolution model, the Joint Conflict Model 
(JCM), which was developed as a part of the Pacific 
Command's Joint Training Forces Simulation System (JTFSS), 
is used as an exercise driver for training of Joint Task 
Force commanders and staffs. This simulation can model up 
to five sides (as compared to ten with JTS and six with 
Janus 6.0), and it models both conventional and 
unconventional warfare as well as special operations. It 
also emphasizes amphibious and littoral operations. 
The JCM system possesses the capability for modeling 
SOF missions. High levels of resolution allows very 
detailed analysis down to the team/element level. It can 
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possibly be used as a staff trainer for JSOTF to SOCCE. 
This model provides a diverse range of modeling 
possibilities, including civil affairs (CA) and FID. 
The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) is a 
merger of both JTS and JCM capabilities. It is scheduled 
for release in the Fall of 1997. 
C. MISSION PLANNING MODELS FOR THE FUTURE 
The potential importance of SOF as an implement for 
swaying international incidents continues to grow. These 
operations frequently require avoidance of numerous 
detection systems, of not only enemy but friendly forces as 
well. The requirement to avoid detection and compromise and 
to execute under almost any conditions mandates 
sophisticated mission planning systems. 
Providing SOF with capabilities to plan for and respond 
to missions ranging from those of national importance to 
routine taskings requires capitalization on state-of-the-art 
automated tools for mission planning, analysis, rehearsal, 
and execution support to coordinate and integrate detailed 
administrative, operational, logistical, communications, and 
intelligence information necessary for successful mission 
execution. 56 The Mission Planning, Analysis, Rehearsal, 
56Interviews with John R. Cox, MPARE Program Analyst, USSOCOM 
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and Equipment (MPARE) system is the future "architecture" 
planned for SOF to prepare for and execute joint missions. 
Through the integration of the existing automated tools 
that support the execution of SOF missions, this program 
intends to establish protocols, procedures, st~ndards, and 
other required instrumentation that will enable the 
connectivity, communication, and integration of the 
different types of packages which will constitute MPARE. 
A driving force behind MPARE is the capability of 
planners and operators to share common and complete tactical 
imagery. This sharing is to occur through networking the 
available intelligence, imagery, charts, graphics, and other 
appropriate information. Such a capability would allow for 
"warrior pull", or the ability for planners and operators to 
select information from a vast pool of information. This 
innovation would ensure that everyone is pulling the same 
information, including overlays, graphics or mission plans. 
For example, ARSOA assets could "pull" supported SF 
insertion locations from their graphic overlays to insure 
there is no misunderstanding as to the exact locations of 
the actual infiltration points. Currently, mission planning 
systems are independent of one another and cannot support 
collaborative planning, especially when units are separated 
geographically. 
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1. MPARE Mission Planning 
MPARE mission planning will include force, unit, and 
element-level planning capabilities; mission folder 
preparation; target area analysis, target vulnerability 
assessment; mixed force allocation; mixed-force mission 
development; timing, coordination, and deconfliction 
assessments. Once the initial planning, force allocations, 
data collection, and database generation are accomplished, 
the force-level systems will prepare mission tasking and 
supporting mission-specific data packages for use by tasked 
units. 
2. Mission Analysis 
Analysis tools will be incorporated into the 
architecture for COA analysis, plan effectiveness, and post-
mission analysis. 
3. Mission Preview, Rehearsal and Execution 
Mission preview and rehearsal will include real-time 
generation of perspective scene displays with route and 
enemy order-of-battle presentations to support free roam 
fly, walk, swim and cruise through visual preview of areas 
of interest. This will be done by simulating normal vision, 
night vision goggle (NVG), low-light-level television 
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(LLLTV), forward looking infrared radar (PLIR), sonar, and 
ground-mapping radar views based on available terrain 
elevation data, imagery, and other supporting data. 
During mission execution, MPARE systems will permit 
operators to take advantage of automated support to quickly 
react to situations, such as altering routes while remaining 
clear of enemy detection. Controlling headquarters will 
also be able to track and support tactical situations. 
MPARE may well be the "master plan" to bring combat 
simulation modeling out of the training closet and on to the 
tactical playing field. This architecture is needed now and 
must be validated as soon as possible in order to implement 
its benefits in operational SOP units. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Education 
In order for combat simulation to become an integral 
part of SOP mission planning, commanders, planners and users 
need to become familiar with the basic concepts of 
stochastic. reasoning and its implications in modern combat. 
As a result of the redesigned curriculum, Special Operations 
Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) now take courses in deterministic 
and probability modeling in preparation for hands-on high 
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resolution simulation modeling instruction. This innovative 
incorporation of modeling and simulation into the SO/LIC 
curriculum addressing combat theory and research allows SO 
students to recognize the benefits of a quantitative 
approach to mission planning. 
High resolution modeling can be taught in basic courses 
or more advanced courses, for Combined Armed Services Staff 
School (CAS3), Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and 
other schools where tactics and combat skills are 
emphasized. The NPS can provide technical expertise and 
courses through its distance learning programs. It is 
important for users to see not only combat simulation 
demonstrated, but also to apply it in order to understand 
its potential benefits. Users can learn the basic 
applications within approximately eight hours and become 
extremely proficient within about forty hours! 
The potential is unlimited for the use of high 
resolution modeling within ARSOA. It could be an 
imaginative planning tool for Green Platoon57 participants 
to better visualize tactical scenarios, terrain analysis and 
historical examination of past ARSOA missions. The more 
combat simulation is used, the more its applications become 
evident. 
57 Initial ARSOA training for selected officers and aviators. 
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2. Terrain Files 
It is imperative that sufficient terrain file data 
be kept available in case the user should have world-wide 
responsibilities. Proactive and intelligent assessment of 
future needs, including OPLAN/CONPLAN requirements, can 
provide the foundation for impending terrain data needs. 
The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) can provide additional 
files, but will need time to do so. As technology and 
demand for terrain data improve, greater storage 
capabilities will become available to maintain a large 
terrain file repository~ 
3. Database Integrity 
It is a lengthy and time consuming responsibility to 
develop and maintain an objective database. The Army's 
TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) does currently maintain a 
large database of friendly and enemy (mostly former Soviet) 
equipment. 58 More information needs to be incorporated into 
this database. The database manager must act as an honest 
broker to verify, consolidate and log all database entries. 
If combat simulation is to be a viable instrument in ARSOA 
mission planning, then databases must remain objective and 
as complete as possible to paint a "real world" picture. 
58 Hakala, p. 51. 
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E. CONCLUSIONS 
Not everyone is, nor will be, an advocate of combat 
simulation in the mission planning process. Its training 
value may be evident, but its use as a SO mission planning 
tool may appear to some as speculative. Those-who have 
"played with" or seen demonstrations of high resolution 
modeling may never have contemplated its potential as an 
insightful tool for implementation at the operator level. 
Many decision makers feel that current ways of conducting 
business are sufficient and that the status quo should 
suffice. Others believe this position is too limited given 
our rapidly changing technologies and conflicted world. 
The world of computer games are filled with mission 
planning, preview and execution games. The U.S. Marine 
Corps is assessing off-the-shelf personal computer (PC) 
games as training tools. 59 Titles of operational games 
such as Panzer General, Command and Conquer, and Marine Doom 
offer realistic situations, a time-stress factor, and a "fun 
factor" which will bring the individual back for more. 60 
With these and other new and intriguing games in many 
homes today, a new computer-oriented generation may more 
readily accept the value of combat simulation. High 
resolution combat modeling, while not an off-the-shelf game, 
59See "Looking for a Few Good Games," PC Gamer, April 1996, pp. 79-86. 
60 Ibid., p. 84. 
100 
does offer engaging potential for users and brings the user 
back for more. 
To validate the value of combat simulation in mission 
planning, we must realize that high resolution modeling is 
not the answer to planning and predicting mission success. 
Nevertheless, as Professor Wayne Hughes so eloquently 
states: 
... we may have understated the quality of models 
simply for description and understanding. The 
quality we want in our decision makers, apart 
from the willpower to which modeling can not 
contribute, is wisdom. Wisdom neither asks nor 
expects very powerful predictions. It sniffs 
out the alternative futures itself with the help 
of models to explore the possibilities. Wisdom 
is intelligent application of knowledge, and 
knowledge is understanding of phenomenon, which 
we call science .... The train of thought that leads 
from explanation to understanding to 
prognostication to creation (inspired planning) 
is beyond the powers of most of us to trace ... 61 
Using models will not make us tactical geniuses. It 
will not discover new tactics. But it can help us evaluate 
and validate new stratagem. As Lord Rayleigh, a great 
scientist said: "The higher mysteries of being, if 
penetrable at all by human intellect, require other weapons 
than those of calculation and experiment" 62 
61 Hughes, Military Modeling, p vii. 
62 Ibid., p. ix. 
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The role that high resolution modeling plays in the 
future will depend on the imagination and ingenuity of its 
users. Modeling alone will not make us better planners, but 
it can add breadth and scope to our ability to think, 
analyze, predict, and comprehend. It can give_U.S. forces a 
competitive edge and help increase our combat effectiveness. 
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GLOSSARY 
The following definitions are furnished to the 
acquaint the reader with terms and concepts discussed in 
this study. The terms appear in order of their use in the 
thesis. 
HIGH RESOLUTION COMBAT MODELING (combat modeling or combat 
simulation, high resolution combat simulation) A high 
resolution combat model is one which includes the detailed 
interactions of individual combatants or weapons systems. 
Each combatant in a high resolution model has its own vector 
of state variables which describe its unique situation and 
its unique perception of the battlefield as the battle 
progressed. Interactions among combatants are resolved at 
the one-on-one engagement level-- often computing separately 
the results of each individual shot fired in the battle. 
The engagement models include terrain and environmental 
effects as well as the states of the firer and the target. 
The emphasis on detail makes high resolution models 
reasonably believable as representations of combat, but it 
also limits high resolution models to fairly small forces --
typically battalions. High resolution models are generally 
stochastic -- including uncertainties in many of the combat 
process submodels. [Ref: Professor Sam Parry, Naval 
Postgraduate School, notes from Operations Analysis class 
"Airland Combat Models I", 1992] 
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION (ARSOA) The 160th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) Airborne (A) is Army 
Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA). This unit is the 
Department of the Army Aviation asset assigned to the U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USASOC), Fort Bragg, North 
Ca~olina. The 160th SOAR (A) is comprised of three active 
battalions, one forward deployed company, and one SOA 
training company. [Ref: 160th SOAR Mission Planning Guide. 
P.1-1] 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS (SO) Operations conducted by specially 
organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary 
forces to achieve military, political, economic, or 
psychological objectives by unconventional military means in 
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These 
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operations are conducted during peacetime competition, 
conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with 
operations of conventional, nonspecial-operations forces. 
Political-military considerations frequently shape special 
operations, requiring clandestine, covert or low visibility 
techniques and oversight at the national level. Special 
operations differ from conventional operations in degree of 
physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of 
employment, independence from friendly support,_ and 
dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 
indigenous assets. [Ref: Joint Pub 3-05, p. GL-20] 
MISSION PLANNING AGENT (MPA) The subordinate special 
operations force commander designated by the joint force 
special operations component commander to validate, plan, 
and execute a particular special operations mission. [Ref: 
Joint Pub 3-05.5. p. GL-8] 
NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY (NCA) The President and the 
Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or 
successors. [Ref: Joint Pub 1-02 and Joint Pub 3-05.3. p. 
GL-20] 
COMBAT MODELS Simulation Models which attempt to provide a 
detailed mathematical representation of the actual sequence 
of detailed physical events that occur during combat. [Ref: 
Battilega and Grange, The Military Applications of Modeling, 
p. 76] 
LIVE SIMULATION Includes battalion field training exercises 
(FT~), National Training Center (NTC) and [Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC)] rotations which constitute the 
closest approximation to actual battle that can practically 
be achieved today. [Ref: study paper "Application of Virtual 
Simulation to Live Simulation Training: Demonstration of 
Concept" by Charles A. Gainer, USARI Aviation R&D Activity.] 
VIRTUAL SIMULATION Prior to field training (live simulation) 
units train in mission planning, preparation, and execution 
with "experts". Training is conducted by NTC observer 
controllers (0/C) and USAAVNC staff using the Aviation 
Testbed (AVTB) Simnet facility. Units undergoing this 
training are presented with tactical and operational 
situations similar to those to be conducted in live 
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simulation. Through virtual simulation training, live 
simulation is more productive and effective. [Ref: study 
paper "Application of Virtual Simulation to Live Simulation 
Training: Demonstration of Concept" by Charles A. Gainer, 
USARI Aviation R&D Activity.] 
CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION The use of computer models such as 
Janus, Joint Tactical Simulation (JTS) or the Joint Conflict 
Model (JCM) for analysis in mission preparation. [Ref: 
Conversation with Charles A. Gainer at USARI Aviation R&D 
Activity.] 
STOCHASTIC Probabilistic in·nature; Of, relating to, or 
characterized by conjecture; Involving or containing random 
variable or variables; involving chance or probability. 
[Ref: Giordano and Weir, A First Course in Mathematical 
Modeling, p. 121; Microsoft Bookshelf.] 
JOINT DOCTRINE Prepared under the direction of the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sets forth principles and 
military guidance to govern the joint activities and 
employment of the Armed Forces of the United States [Ref: 
Joint Pub 3-05] 
JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES and PROCEDURES (JTTP) The actions 
and methods that implement joint doctrine ·and describe how 
forces will be employed in joint operations. Joint Pub 3-05 
provides broad doctrinal guidance for strategic and 
operational joint employment of SOF. Supporting JTTP 
publications (Joint Pubs 3-05.3 & 3-05.5) have been 
developed to amplify this joint special operations doctrine. 
[Ref: Joint Pub 3-05, I-2] 
SPECIAL RECONNAISANCE (SR) Reconnaissance and surveillance 
actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or 
verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, 
information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and 
activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data 
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic 
characteristics of a particular area. It includes target 
acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike 
reconnaissance. [Ref: Joint Pub 3-05, p. GL-11] 
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DIRECT ACTION (DA) Short-duration strikes and other small-
scale offensive actions by special operations forces to 
seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on 
designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these 
operations, special operations forces may employ raid, 
ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other 
munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, 
ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for 
precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent 
sabotage. [Ref: Joint Pub 3-05.5, p. GL-5] 
MISSION TASKING (MITASK) A directive that assigns a mission 
to a subordinate commander; provides essential planning 
guidance, and directs the initiation of mission planning. A 
mission tasking may be issued as a warning order, planning 
order, alert order, or execute order. [Ref: Joint Pub 3-
05.5, GL-8] 
EARLIEST ANTICIPATED LAUNCH TIME (EALT) The earliest time 
expected for a special operations tactical element and its 
supporting platform to depart the staging or marshaling area 
together enroute to the operations area. [Ref: Joint Pub 3-
05.5, p. GL-5] 
JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC) A general term applied to a 
commander authorized to exercise Combatant Command (command 
authority) or operational control over a joint force. [Ref: 
Joint Pub 1-02] 
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APPENDIX A: JANUS FEATURES 
CAC - A feature giving the user the capability to draw, 
store recall, and display Command and Control (CAC) 
overlays. 
Checkpoint - An option that records the state of the 
simulation at regular intervals. In the event -of an 
abnormal termination (of a scenario), a user can restart the 
simulation from the most recent checkpoint instead of from 
the beginning. (This would be extremely useful for a 
mission planner to look at modeled actions on the objective 
from release point inbound to the target.) 
Controller Workstation - The Controller Workstation (CONWOR) 
is an "observer" workstation. It permits the user to see 
nearly all events taking place during a scenario run. Since 
the controller workstation displays ALL sides, the user may 
watch all sides, one side only, one group of a side only, 
one task force of a side only, or one specific unit while 
the scenario is running. 
Defilade - Units may be in one of three protective 
categories: exposed, in partial defilade, or full defilade. 
Moving units are always exposed, but automatically go into 
partial defilade soon after stopping. The user controls 
full defilade manually. 
Direct Fire Engagements - Direct Fire systems engage enemy 
systems automatically. To assess results, Janus considers 
database settings like weapons capabilities, enemy 
vulnerability, and Probability of Hit and Probability of 
Kill (PH/PK) tables, as well as the systems' aspect 
(stationary/moving, head-on/flank) and intervisibility. 
Help - Users may ask for help for all menu items and have 
help messages displayed on the screen. 
Holdfire - Users may designate direct~fire units not to 
fire. 
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Indirect Fire - Users may plan and fire indirect fire 
missions, including mortars. Options include scheduled or 
on-call missions, number of volleys, type of munitions, and 
parallel or converged sheaf. Missions may be normal, timed 
or priority. Users may alter or cancel planned missions. 
Users may also plan Target Reference Points (TRPs). Users 
may create or delete TRPs. Users may also "REPEAT" 
currently firing or previously fired missions. 
Line of Sight - Users may check the Line of Sight (LOS) of a 
system at any location in the current view display. The 
user may also use this function while deploying units by 
determining the line of sight from a point on the display 
before deploying the unit. 
Mount/Dismount - Users may mount units on designated 
carriers consistent with volume and weight limits. Mounted 
units dismount on command. 
Movement - Users establish movement routes for air and 
ground units to follow. Once established, routes may be 
copied to other units, changed, and deleted. 
Obscuration - Janus models the effects of smoke and dust. 
Additionally, smoke and dust clouds build, drift with the 
wind, and dissipate. 
Obstacles - Users may emplace minefields, abatis, craters, 
and ditches. 
Prepos - Units may construct and occupy prepared two-step 
fighting positions. 
Reports - Users may display a variety of reports: everything 
from scheduled artillery missions to casualty reports. 
Run Speed - The Run Speed function allows the user to change 
the speed at which the simulation runs. The default run 
speed factor of 1.00 runs the simulation at or near real 
time. The higher the run speed factor the faster the 
simulation will run. A run speed factor of 3.00 (up to a 
maximum of 5.00) will run at approximately three minutes of 
simulated time for every one minute of real time. 
Task Organization - Users may group their units into task 
forces to accomplish a particular mission. 
UTM Grid - Janus will display the Universal Transverse 
Mercator. 
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Zoom - A feature allowing the user to magnify any part of 
the screen display. Thirteen levels of magnification are 
available, plus the additional level that corresponds to the 
standard military scale of 1:50,000. 
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APPENDIX B: CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
(SO) AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) 
(See Joint Pub 3-05, pp. I-4-6.) 
Characteristics of Special Operations Distinguishing 
properties which accrued distinguish them from conventional 
operations. 
a. Are principally offensive, usually of high physical and 
political risk, and directed at high-value targets, 
critical, and often perishable targets. They offer the 
potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance 
should a first mission fail. 
b. Are often principally politico-military in nature and 
subject to oversight at the national level. Frequently 
demand operator-level detailed planning and rapid 
coordination with other commands, services and government 
agencies. 
c. Often require responsive joint ground, air, and 
maritime operations and the C2 architecture permanently 
resident in the existing SOF structure. 
d. May frequently be covert or clandestine. 
e. Are frequently prosecuted when the use of conventional 
forces is either inappropriate or unfeasible for either 
military or pol1tical reasons. 
f. Rely on surprise, security, and audacity and frequently 
employ deception to achieve success. 
g. Are often conducted at great distances from established 
support bases, requiring sophisticated communications and 
means of infiltration, exfiltration, and support to 
penetrate and recover from hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive areas. 
h. May require patient, long-term commitment in a given 
operational area to achieve national goals through security 
assistance and/or nation assistance activities or extended 
UW operations. Often, the training and organization of 
indigenous forces are required to attain these objectives. 
i. Frequently require discriminate and precise use of force; 
a mix of high and low technology weapons and equipment; and 
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often rapid deployment, acquisition, and employment of 
weapons and equipment not standard for other DOD forces. 
j. Are primarily conducted by specially recruited, selected, 
and trained personnel, organized into small units tailored 
for specific missions or environments. Missions often 
require detailed knowledge of the culture(s) and 
languages(s) of the country where employed. 
k. Require detailed intelligence, thorough planning, 
decentralized execution, and rigorous detailed rehearsal. 
Characteristics of Special Operations Forces The demands of 
SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from 
conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with these 
characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are 
compatible with their capabilities. (Joint Pub 3-05, pp. I-
S I 6. ) 
a. Personnel may undergo lengthy selection processes or 
extensive mission-specific training programs above basic 
military skill training to achieve entry level SO skills. 
b. Units·are small and necessarily maintain high personal 
and professional levels of maturity and experience, usually 
in more than one principal field. The complex SO selection 
and long lead time objective and subjective maturation 
process make any rapid replacement of personnel or 
capabilities very difficult. 
c. SOF are often organized jointly and routinely plan, 
execute, command, and control operations from a joint 
perspective. 
d. Area orientation is often required and includes the 
capability to execute foreseeable operations in the full 
range of the area's environmental conditions. Detailed area 
orientation, including mastery of language and culture, 
requires long-term, dedicated training and may be applicable 
to air, ground, and maritime SOF units, depending upon 
mission assignment. 
e. To develop and maintain skills, SOF should train and 
exercise under conditions resembling the operational 
environment in which they intend to operate. 
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APPENDIX C: TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING CYCLE 
AND TARGETING DIAGRAM. 




(Diagram Annotations on the Following Page.) 
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TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING CYCLE 
AND TARGETING DIAGRAM ANNOTATIONS 
1. JFC component commanders or national-level intelligence 
assets identify potential targets. Targets are selected by 
the JFC's staff or Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) 
if used and assigned to the JFSOCC by MITASK. IPAs update 
the Target Intelligence Package (TIP) or assimilate required 
intelligence. MPAs forward intelligence requests through 
the JFSOCC, other component commanders, or JFSOCC to the 
theater intelligence agencies who then request national-
level intelligence support if necessary. The required 
intelligence is then disseminated directly to the requesting 
organization, depending on the time factor and operational 
security situation. 
2. The JFSOCC, JFSOCC staff or JFSOCC target panel perform 
and abbreviated feasibility assessment (FA) and send a 
MITASK to the MPA. If a Special Operations Mission Planning 
Folder (SOMPF) was prepared in the deliberate planning 
cycle, the JFSOCC will pass it to the MPA with the MITASK. 
If the MPA does not validate the target SOP execution, then 
the MPA must inform the JFSOCC and await further guidance. 
3. If the target is validated, then the MPA develops the 
MICON and coordinates MSRs with supporting agencies. 
4. The MPA sends the MICON to JFSOCC and MSRs to support-
ing agencies, with information copies to the JFSOCC. 
5. The supporting agencies confirm MSRs by MSC. 
6. The JFSOCC reviews and approves the MICON by MSA. 
7. MPA coordinates execution planning with the executing 
SO unit and supporting agencies. 
8. The JFSOCC recommends to the JFC that the mission be 
approved, disapproved, modified, or canceled. 
9. The JFC makes a decision on the mission by EXORD. The 
EXORD is passed through the JFSOCC to the MPA. 
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APPENDIX D: TIME SENSITIVE MISSION PLANNING CYCLE 
(See Joint Pub 3-05.5) 
Phase 1: Objectives and Guidance. The MISSION TASKING 
(MITASK) initiates the time-sensitive SO planning process 
and should be sent to the operational component 96 hours 
before EARLIEST ANTICIPATED LAUNCH TIME (EALT) . The MITASK 
should be transmitted within 4 hours of mission receipt. 
The JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC) passes mission guidance to 
the JFSOCC by a MITASK. The MITASK may (1), task new or 
preplanned targets requiring updates; (2) grants direct 
liaison authorization (DIRLAUTH) between MPA and 
Intelligence Production Agency (IPA) . Upon MITASK receipt, 
the JFSOCC analyzes the mission for tasks and feasibility 
and then sends a MITASK to the MPA(s), supporting agencies, 
and IPA and authorizes DIRLAUTH between requisite 
organizations. The IPA provides the ·MPA and supporting 
agencies with all immediately available intelligence within 
12 hours of MITASK receipt. 
Phases 2 and 3: Target Development and Weaponeering. 
The combination of these two stages are conducted more 
briefly, with less detail and more fragmentary data under 
time-sensitive targeting conditions. The MPA begins its 
estimate process and mission concept (MICON) development; 
and coordinates with the supporting agencies to examine 
insertion and extraction options. The IPA continues to 
provide intelligence products as they become available. No 
later than 72 hours before the EALT, the MPA transmits the 
MICON to the JFSOCC. The MPA simultaneously submits mission 
support requests (MSRs) to the supporting agencies, with an 
information copy to the JFSOCC. No later than 48 hours 
before the EALT, the supporting agencies send mission 
~ support confirmation (MSCs) to the MPA, with information 
copies to the JFSOCC. 
Phase 4: Force Selection. The JFSOCC may approve, 
alter or disapprove MICONs and MSRs and then transmits 
Mission Concept Approval (MCA) to the MPA within 8 hours of 
MICON receipt. Supporting agencies receive information 
copies. Disapproved MICONs should include guidance and a 
suspense for a new MICON. Normally, the type of force 
(e.g., SFODA, SEAL platoon) has already been selected and 
specified in the MITASK issued by the JFSOCC. 
Phase 5. Mission Planning. No later than 24 hours 
before the EALT, the JFSOCC should issue the Execute Order 
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(EXORD) . Changes to the mission after transmission of this 
confirmation may result in mission delay. Other elements 
continue detailed mission planning and preparation. The IPA 
continues to be integrally involved in the final phase of 
planning. The supporting agencies obtain the latest weather 
and intelligence updates, prepare and stage platforms for 
the mission. 
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